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
The war in Katanga

REPORT OF A MISSION

THE UNITED NATIONS
IN THE CONGO

BY ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG

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PREFACE

During the early part of December, 1961, the press of the world devoted a great deal of space to the United Nations military action in Katanga. Yet the news reports from the Congo were spotty at best. The public relations department of the United Nations was interested mainly in justifying the UN's own operations.

The American people became concerned when they learned that the United States government was providing air and other logistical support to this U.N. military action. However, there seemed to be no focus for this concern; above all, facts were too scanty. In an effort to provide this focus, and to articulate the public concern, the American Committee for Aid to Katanga Freedom Fighters was launched on December 14, 1961, with a full page advertisement in *The New York Times*. The Committee immediately enlisted a group of American leaders in many fields of endeavor as sponsors.

The response to the announcement of the formation of our Committee was instantaneous and widespread. Upwards of 5,000 individuals throughout the country sent financial contributions for the work of the Committee. Additional thousands of letters were received at our Committee's headquarters from citizens informing us that they were writing to their representatives in Washington, to the American Ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai E. Stevenson, to President Kennedy and to U.N. Secretary General U Thant, demanding that U.N. military action against Katanga be stopped and that the United States withdraw support of U.N. military operations in Katanga. Our Committee's statement was reprinted in nineteen major newspapers through local contributions, and aroused world-wide discussion.

In an effort to obtain the facts, without coloration of propaganda or vested interests from either side, we prevailed upon the distinguished social scientist, Professor Ernest van den Haag, to visit the Congo and prepare the analytical report which we here present for public consideration.

The resources available to our Committee are modest. Professor van den Haag feels that there are many facets which require further investigation. However, both he and our Committee believe that the facts that he has established so far are sufficiently disturbing to make publication of this report imperative in the public interest. We hope that it will stimulate re-examination of the policies that the United Nations and our own government have followed in the Congo, and of their bearing on the future of liberty in Africa and on our own security.

MAX
YERGAN Chairman

American Committee for Aid to Katanga Freedom Fighters

THE WAR IN KATANGA:

REPORT OF A MISSION

by ERNEST
VAN DEN HAAG

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INTRODUCTION I

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*"...approach the faults of the state...with
pious awe and trembling solicitude."*

EDMUND BURKE

ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG

Late in December, 1961 I arrived in the Congo on behalf of the American Committee for Aid to Katanga Freedom Fighters, which had been formed earlier that month, when United Nations troops, supported by the United States, were conducting active military operations in Katanga Province. I went in order to:

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- a) ascertain the facts, purposes and effects of the U. N. attack;
- b) help understand and evaluate United States policies in the Congo;
- c) suggest policy alternatives;
- d) explore how Americans could best aid the Congo, and particularly the victims of the Katanga fighting.

The nine days I actually spent in the Congo—half in Adoula's Leopoldville, half in Tshombe's Elisabethville—did not make me an expert. Nevertheless, I learned a great deal and modified my views in some ways—enough to convince me that few U. N. diplomats would have voted to attack Katanga had they seen for themselves what happened there. Unfortunately, first-hand study is unpopular in U. N. circles. Thus, even Dr. Sture Linner, U. N. representative in the Congo, had not visited Elisabethville when I saw him. Perhaps that made it easier to authorize what turned out to be the sacking of that once beautiful and peaceful city. Dr. Linner, himself, was told to conquer Elisabethville by diplomats who had never set foot in Katanga. Finally, the actual attack was organized by Dr. Conor Cruise O'Brian, whose press statements suggest that somehow he was under the impression that he was

fighting against England. (Described to me as a brilliant and zealous man, O'Brian appears to have been far more schooled in anti-British folklore than in African realities.) The whole thing reminds one of Evelyn Waugh's comic novels—except that the killings were not fiction, which made it hard for the Katangans to laugh.

Certainly Assistant Secretaries Carl T. Rowan and G. Mennen Williams would not have found it

so easy to shrug off the murders and robberies committed by U. N. troops in Elisabethville had they seen the city under occupation after the attack.¹ I am confident, too, that our State Department would not have supported the U. N. military operations had it known about the combination of savagery and incompetence with which they were carried out. All the public relations departments in the world will not convince otherwise anyone who has seen for himself.²

¹ See N. Y. Times, 12/27/61

² None of us looks at the world with pristine eyes. I certainly had some ideas about the Congo before I went there. Like all human beings, I form preliminary opinions when my knowledge is incomplete and indirect. However, I believe myself able, and certainly willing to modify and, if facts or logic demand, to change altogether my views as my knowledge increases. I have done so often. The major facts I report in the following cannot be seriously contested. As for the interpretations, they embody my best judgment and are entrusted to the reader's.



TSHOMBE VISITS WOUNDED: Katanga President Moise Tshombe visiting one of the casualties of the December fighting with U.N. troops in Elisabethville.

II PERSONS AND PLACES

I went to the Congo as an American citizen concerned primarily with American foreign policy and convinced that the success of that policy is linked to the preservation of freedom, and to the defeat of communism in Africa as everywhere else. I returned persuaded that the United States committed a grievous error in supporting the U.N. actions in Katanga. Fortunately the State Department now has turned to a policy of negotiation and conciliation there. No doubt the pressure of public opinion helped bring about this

change. The magnificent job done by American personnel on the spot also helped change the State Department's previous blind "the U.N. right or wrong" policies. American policies should be respectful of the right of all Congolese to determine their own fate; we should never again support the ambition of some African states and of the Soviet bloc to violate this right, however much their ambition be cloaked under the U.N. mantle. Our power was used in the Congo as a tool by the enemies of freedom. We must not allow this to happen again.

¹*The American Committee for Aid to Katanga Freedom Fighters played a major role in focusing attention on the Katanga actions and in articulating public opinion.*

1. LEOPOLDVILLE

I arrived in Leopoldville December 30, and left for Elisabethville January 3. In my four days in Leopoldville, I spoke with as many persons as I could, officials and private citizens.

Mr. Edmund Gullion, our Ambassador to the Congo, made an excellent case for our current policy. As he expounded them, the aims of that policy—reunion of the Congo in a freely negotiated Federation; defeat of communist intrigue, violence and influence—are entitled to the support of every American citizen. I retained much doubt about the means we used—which were often more apt to defeat than to achieve these aims. Nor did it seem that alternative policies have been sufficiently considered in the event that our estimate of Premier Adoula's aims or abilities should prove wrong, or that the U.N. should be persuaded again to attack Katanga. I have no doubt, though, that in Mr. Gullion we have an able, dedicated—and overworked—ambassador.

Mr. Fitzhugh Green, in charge of U.S.I.S. activities in Leopoldville, was very helpful. It was a pleasant surprise to discover that the U.S.I.S. activities seem useful and well organized. We could safely increase U.S.I.S. appropriations were we but sure that they are used as well everywhere.

I had a long and friendly conversation with the U.N. representative in the Congo, Dr. Sture Linner. Well-meaning and dedicated, this former

professor of classics tries to make the best of the chaotic, pretentious, and costly organization left by his predecessor, Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal. (Dayal is held in universal contempt in Leopoldville, where he is regarded as snobbish, prejudiced, incompetent, and power-drunk.) Dr. Linner managed to improve matters considerably. Still, the U.N. overpays many of its employees (largely at American expense), occupies the best building in town and, to some extent, gives the impression of rivaling rather than assisting the Congolese government. Some of its hastily recruited personnel are of dubious competence; others are imbued with anti-Belgian and assorted other prejudices; no doubt most are conscientious and competent.

Of course, Dr. Linner had to act on vague and inconsistent directives emanating from the deliberative bodies of the U.N. He too is overworked and, not having been in Elisabethville, inclined to shrug off as "propaganda" the outcries against the savagery of his troops there. When I mentioned complaints against Ethiopian troops, he countered that an Ethiopian general was investigating them. I do not have much confidence in the accused investigating themselves. I found it hard to believe that Dr. Linner has. I was informed later that the Ethiopian troops have no organization providing for military justice; yet the soldiers have *de facto* immunity from prosecution and trial by any other judicial body. The U.N. has

not seen fit to set up any organization to process complaints by civilians against its troops. In effect, then, any U.N. soldier has a license to murder and rob in Katanga—unless his superiors check him. Unfortunately, they have not done so effectively. (The Gurkha troops must be excepted: they acted vigorously, but observed scrupulously the rules of warfare and of civilized behavior.) No known punishment has been meted out to uniformed U.N. malefactors.¹

When I mentioned to Dr. Linner a telegram signed by 46 Elisabethville physicians protesting atrocities alleged to have been committed by his troops there, Dr. Linner doubted that there were that many physicians in Elisabethville. I found later that there are 51. I spoke with 10 I selected at random from the full list. All confirmed their signature and the facts alleged in the telegram. I mention this to suggest that even a sensible man of good will—as I am convinced Dr. Linner is—may become prejudiced, particularly if he is so overworked that he finds no time to investigate on the spot.

Since the U.N. has ceased to be a neutral in Congolese affairs and has become a belligerent, a neutral organization—such as the International Red Cross—should be asked to deal with complaints against its troops.

Dr. Linner had no satisfactory explanation for the U.N. leniency—not to say indulgence—which left unpunished all the crimes of the Stanleyville pro-communist Gizenga group, including the murder of 13 Italian airmen, of missionaries, and of many indigenous political opponents.² The failure of the U.N. to deter further crimes by punishment, or to protect the prospective victims, or to take any preventive measures, has since led to ever more and worse atrocities by Stanleyville soldiers. However, Linner referred to the U.N. resolutions ordering him to get rid of “mercenaries” to explain the contrasting harshness, which he minimized, of the military action against the comparatively peaceful Katanga Province.

There was an instructive discussion about the word “mercenary”. Dr. Linner first defined “mercenaries” as people paid for fighting. When I noted that this would make all the officers of the United States army “mercenaries”, Dr. Linner

declared that “mercenaries” fight for a country not their own. I noted that this might possibly make the U.N. troops more “mercenary” than the Katanga troops. Dr. Linner finally specified “mercenaries” are soldiers motivated solely by pay. Although admiring the ability of the U.N. public relations staff to uncover the secrets of the human heart and find out what makes men fight (when they don’t fight for the U.N.), I remained puzzled: why did the U.N. not offer more pay to the Katanga “mercenaries” for not fighting, than the Katanga government offered for fighting? Surely if they are interested only in money, the mercenaries would lay down their arms.³ Financially, this would be less costly than military action. Further, the civilian population would be spared suffering; the U.N., defeat and disrepute. To attack a vast population with planes, mortars, bazookas and machine guns for the sake of removing a few people⁴ from their midst is surely sadistic under these circumstances. It was also unsuccessful.

Dr. Linner refused to discuss my suggestion. I am forced to conclude that he has little faith in his own official view of the “mercenary” nature of the white officers and specialists fighting with the Katanga army. As will be shown below, the “mercenary” issue was a transparent pretext for a U.N. action that had less silly and more far-reaching aims.

A half-hour conversation with Premier Adoula persuaded me that he is a skilled and intelligent politician who might well help his country to become viable. However, the Premier was more guarded than informative. Whenever I asked about his future policies, he told me that these were up to Parliament. When I asked how he intended to use his influence on Parliament, he evaded the question further. He insisted that President Tshombe’s actions in Katanga were impermissible because unconstitutional. He was unwilling, however, to be reminded of the Tana-narive agreement in which he and others stated that the *loi fondamentale*, fashioned by Belgians and imposing centralized government, was not viable and had to be changed.

Nevertheless, Premier Adoula assured me of his desire for reconciliation and his willingness to bury the past. I asked why he had sent Egyde Bocheley-Davidson as “commissioner” to rule

¹I understand some Swedes were sent home because of “unsuitability”. This term seems to cover matters ranging from venereal infection to armed robbery.

²Documentation of the earlier crimes is found in President Kasavubu’s aide memoir (UN document A/4711/Add. 2, dated March 20, 1961).

³In late medieval and renaissance Europe mercenaries often were bought off.

⁴It is doubtful whether there were ever more than 200 “mercenaries.” The highest estimate I heard was 300-400. The number may well have fluctuated.

Katanga when he hoped that the U.N. would conquer it for him. This deputy was accused in the past by President Kasavubu of atrocities; and he is a member of the pro-communist Gizenga group. Mr. Adoula did not defend his past action (or his "commissioner") but indicated that he has no intention of repeating it and does not think that any more commissioners will be sent to Katanga. Though he has since spoken more belligerently before the U.N., I have no reason to doubt him. A man may change his mind.

But it should not again be American policy to help subjugate Katanga for Premier Adoula. We are lucky that, so far, Katanga has held at bay the U.N. forces which we supported; else Katanga would now be under the rule of a pro-Gizenga (i.e., pro-Soviet) "commissioner".

Generally in the Congo there has always been envy and jealousy of the comparative prosperity and progress of Katanga; I was told in Leopoldville—and later in Elisabethville—that the two cities have never seen eye to eye. Recently national and international politicians have further exploited that resentment. Among Congolese politicians, the idea is still widespread that if they could lay their hands on Katanga, all financial worries would be over. At the prospect of home rule for Katanga, their hearts sink; they feel as though they were about to be deprived of a rich inheritance.



Yet the Congo's problems will not be solved through Katanga's riches. Important as these are, they are not sufficient to support Congolese political ambitions in the style to which Congolese politicians would like to become accustomed. (Note the astonishing increases in the Congo

budget since the Belgians left—paralleled by neglect of all concrete administrative work. Not even teachers are being paid.)

The State Department has fostered an even more dangerous illusion in the United States: that the communist problem in the Congo will disappear once the Katanga problem is settled. Yet the Katanga situation arose in *reaction* to Lumumba and Gizenga. Katanga insisted on decentralization, and even separation, in fear—I hope now groundless, but originally all too well founded—that the rest of the Congo might be taken over by pro-communist Lumumbist hordes. It seems incredible in retrospect that the U.N. attempt to force the surrender of the most stoutly anti-communist Congolese—the Katangans—and to hand them over to a pro-communist "commissioner" was supported by the U.S. Yet we did support it and our State Department insisted that this was the way to defeat communism in the Congo.¹

The U.N. did not obtain the surrender of Katanga, and, fortunately, at this writing, the Congolese pro-communists seem on the way to defeat themselves. But this happy development is scarcely due to the U.N. It seems more reasonable to attribute the defeat to communism in the Congo—which I hope is in sight—to the spirited resistance of Tshombe in Katanga, which finally strengthened the hand of other Congolese anti-communists.

¹One is reminded of people who argue that if we were to improve housing conditions, the communist danger would vanish (although it has increased as housing conditions improved). Communism is not due to our slums; anti-Semitism is not due to the behavior of Jews; and communism in the Congo is not due to Katanga's wish for home rule, nor will it be defeated by fighting Katanga.



FIGHTING FOR LIFE: Doctors work to save the life of an infant victim of the December fighting. Bombing and mortar-shelling left some hospitals without light or water, and forced evacuation of the wounded.

ESTABLISHED BY U.N.: An aerial
view of the huge Baluba camp, only
a few miles from Elisabethville.
Some 40,000 Baluba tribesmen live
in the camp, established by the U.N.



2. ELISABETHVILLE

I arrived in Elisabethville January 4 and left January 8. The American Consul, Lewis Hoffacker, met me upon my arrival in Elisabethville. It was my privilege to see Mr. Hoffacker daily while in Elisabethville. When I observed the tireless patience, firmness, friendliness, and not least, sheer physical stamina of our Consul, I felt great pride in being an American.¹ By his exceptional gifts of character and mind, and his literally ceaseless work, Mr. Hoffacker, assisted by a highly competent staff, seems well on the way to restoring American prestige in Elisabethville where it had fallen low, owing to our support of the U. N. actions and also, I was told by residents, to grave faults and errors of our previous Consul. Mr. Hoffacker is held in universal esteem in the strife-torn city (a difficult accomplishment); I cannot think of anyone more deserving of it.

In Elisabethville I saw President Moise Tshombe, Godefroid Munongo, his Minister of the Interior, and most members of his cabinet. I was deeply impressed by President Tshombe's eloquence and resoluteness, and by the blunt vigor and intelligence of his Interior Minister. In conversation, Messrs. Tshombe and Munongo made clear (a) that Katanga wished to retain at least a degree of internal autonomy somewhere between that of a Swiss canton and an American state; (b) that Katanga wanted to remain part of the Congo and seceded only when this condition was denied and a dictatorial pro-communist and lawless government of gangsters seemed to prevail under Lumumba; (c) that negotiation, and probably agreement, with Adoula was possible, provided the U. N. ceased to threaten further military attacks. President Tshombe com-

plained bitterly about American support of the U. N. attempt to compel his surrender and of the U. N.'s sacking the city of Elisabethville, terrorizing its inhabitants and paralyzing its economic life.

In Elisabethville, I also saw a number of physicians and lawyers, nurses and patients, the provincial prosecutor and a great number of white and colored residents. I visited the nearby Baluba camp under the guidance of Major Arne Forslund, and I spoke with a number of Balubas. I met for all too brief a time with Mr. Brian Urquhart, the local U. N. representative. I visited all the hospitals of the city and numerous houses, missions and churches. I met with the Roman Catholic vicar (the archbishop was in the interior), with Rabbi Levy, spiritual head of the Jewish community, and the Reverend Leonard Robinson of the Seventh Day Adventist mission. I met the rector of the local university, Dr. Joachim Frankiel and several of his professors and students including Mr. Stephen Lucas, a student from Optima, Oklahoma, who was enthusiastic about the eagerness of his fellow students to learn, and the matching eagerness of the faculty to teach.

When I arrived, electricity service disrupted by the U. N. bombardment had been restored—thanks to Belgian technicians. Food services were being restored. But fear was still stalking the city; at dark everything closed, and nobody went into the streets who did not have to.²

Economic activity was still paralyzed in Elisabethville. Belgian technicians were afraid to venture out because they were often arbitrarily arrested as "mercenaries" by U. N. troops. Native

¹Mr. Hoffacker undoubtedly could make his life easier were he to confine his assistance to American citizens. However he is not the man to ignore anyone's distress call. And since his helpfulness is well known, he receives and responds to no end of calls.

²Rightly so. My car was shot at on arrival (contrary to my orders, the driver increased the speed, so I will never know by whom). I was arrested by Katanga troops (I lacked some of the prescribed papers). However I was well treated and freed as soon as Mr. Hoffacker had an opportunity to use his persuasive powers.

workers are afraid of the Ethiopian troops, I fear with reason. Many of the productive establishments have been severely damaged by mortar and bazooka shells. Others were still occupied by U.N. troops, which prevented resumption of normal productive activities. (I was also told that the temporary lack of electricity flooded several mine shafts near Elisabethville, but I had not time to see them.) The Union Minière installations in Elisabethville, greatly damaged, were not working, although the corporation continued to pay its workers. A great number of private residences—white and Negro—also were damaged by shells. Missions, churches and hospitals were severely damaged. Many establishments and residences had to be abandoned. If all the damaged houses, churches, hospitals, etc., I saw in every quarter of the city really were used by snipers, as the U.N. maintains, President Tshombe is to be congratulated on the universality of his support. (Parisians seem to have opposed the Nazis with less passion.) It seems as likely that the U.N. soldiers became hysterical when resisted, unless one accepts the local idea—unfortunately not altogether unreasonable—that they wanted to terrorize Elisabethville. They nearly succeeded.

Now, once firing starts, it is hard to determine where a shell comes from. A ballistic expert might know; but I am not one. Still, the following seems to me rather well established:

a) the basic responsibility for injury rests with the original aggressor;

b) the second military action initiated December 5, 1961, was due largely to mutual suspicion, generated by the previous (September) action: each party felt that the other was about to attack, and thought it was acting pre-emptively.

c) however, it is undisputed that the first military action, begun September 13, 1961, which brought the second in its wake, was a military attack of the U.N. forces against the Katanga

forces and ultimately the population of Elisabethville;

d) the general responsibility for the injuries and damages that occurred during the periods of combat therefore rests on the U.N. forces. Katanga has a rightful claim to reparations.¹

Apart from the casualties of combat, a number of acts which are unrelated to any legitimate military purpose appear to have been committed by the U.N. forces. These include:

a) deliberate murder of unarmed, non-combatant civilians, white and black, including women and children;

b) deliberate injury, rape and robbery of unarmed civilian non-combatants, white and black;

c) damage to buildings, including hospitals, churches, and business establishments which were not, and could not reasonably be believed to be, used for military purposes;

d) shooting at ambulances;

e) thefts;

f) arbitrary arrests.

Few are the military conflicts in which atrocities are not alleged to be committed. And as frequently, unfortunately, the conflicts in which the allegation is not true to some extent. Further, I have no doubt that some of the non-combatant victims were caught in crossfire; or that hospitals may have been fired on by troops suspecting that they were used militarily; or that shells may have landed on the wrong target owing to incompetence, accident, etc. Finally, I did not have time, or possess the competence, to investigate all allegations of atrocity.² However, I spoke with a number of foreign, non-Belgian observers (Italians and Greeks, Jews—largely from Rhodes, Swiss and British nationals). I also consul

¹The principle that the aggressor is responsible for damages caused by military action has long been established, and has been applied in the last two World Wars. The fact that the U.N. was the aggressor means simply that the nations in it are corporately responsible.

²On the Katanga side, inter- and intra-tribal atrocities were undoubtedly committed, mainly on and by Baluba. And it is well known, too, that some U.N. representatives were manhandled by mobs and undisciplined Katanga soldiers. However, local mobs have committed such all over the Congo. And the discipline of troops deprives their white officers by the U.N. was bound to suffer. At rate, though we may deplore reprehensible local acts, much as we deplore reprehensible U.N. acts, the former do not justify the latter. And it is for the latter that policies bear some responsibility.



Roman Catholic priests, Methodist ministers, nurses, doctors and many other people whose testimony and views I thought might be of value.

The impression is overwhelming, and overwhelmingly shared, that the U.N. troops, quite apart from legitimate acts of war, and from legitimate mistakes, committed a number of illegitimate and inexcusable acts. These acts to this day remain unpunished. Nor has the U.N. seen fit to acknowledge them, to establish individual responsibility for them or to offer compensation. Therefore the U.N. must assume responsibility for the individual culprits whom it has refused to identify.

I was not present during the period of actual warfare. However, I spoke with many people who were. When time permitted, I obtained affidavits stating what they themselves had seen and experienced. (Some of these are reproduced in the Appendix). I also visited hospitals and spoke with some of the victims of repulsively sadistic acts committed by U.N. soldiers. I saw the injuries with my own eyes. I have no reason whatever to doubt the testimony of the victims as to the circumstances in which the injuries were inflicted.¹ It is hard to speak, as I did, with a mother whose husband was killed at home in her presence with

bayonets by U.N. Ethiopian soldiers. She was in the hospital to help take care of her six year old child, severely wounded by Ethiopian bayonets. A child's bayonet wounds are hardly due to having been suspected of being mercenary or combatant. I cannot believe that such actions merited the American support they received; or that this is the way peace and order will be established in the Congo. It is equally hard to explain as a military act the murder of an 87 year old Belgian woman, Mme. Derricks at her home.

Even a politically justifiable purpose never, in my opinion, justifies torture or murder. But in this case the murders and injuries had no political purpose; they occurred because the U.N. introduced troops it did not know how to discipline; and because no serious attempt was made to protect the civilian population from these troops. If U.N. diplomats in New York were wantonly killed by the local population, or, worse, by American soldiers, then, certainly, and rightly, the American government would be held responsible. If civilians are killed by U.N. soldiers in an occupied city in Katanga, the U.N. is no less responsible.

¹ *I visited hospitals and wards unannounced, and on my own initiative.*

III

THE BACKGROUND OF THE PRESENT SITUATION

The Congo, which at present has almost 14 million inhabitants (of whom nearly 2 million live in Katanga) was explored for the first time less than a hundred years ago. In their comparatively brief stay in the Congo, the Belgians:

- a) stopped inter-tribal warfare, ritual murders and similar customs;
- b) introduced and exploited forced labor with great harshness and cruelty;
- c) later abolished forced labor;
- d) developed the resources of the Congo in a spectacular manner, highly beneficial to them and to the natives;
- e) established an extensive and well-run system of primary and secondary education, but neglected higher education and failed to help the Congolese gain the experience in higher administrative and executive posts which they would need for independence;
- f) neglected to help native leaders acquire the political experience needed for democracy and independence.

Though the motive for the Belgian presence in the Congo was undoubtedly economic exploitation in the first place, one incidental effect was to greatly raise the standard of living of the indigenous population, to reduce infant mortality, improve public health and bring other benefits.¹

Native housing developments in Leopoldville—they are quite extensive—compare well with American ones. Wages are considerably higher,

in real terms, than in Brazzaville (across the Congo river, and formerly French). The excellence of technical installations and the rapid development of the country's great resources through Belgian initiative and capital are undeniable. Both the Belgian government and many private Belgian companies engaged in extensive welfare measures such as vocational schools, hospitals, medical services, housing, etc.² This is particularly true in Katanga, industrially the most developed part of the Congo. Taxes on Belgian initiated enterprises have so far supported practically all the Congo administration. In addition, the Congo government is the beneficial owner of about one-fifth share in the major Belgian enterprises.

Though providing for wide elementary and vocational schooling, the Belgian administration instituted higher schooling only in the last few years before independence. (Late as they were, the Belgians started in style: *e.g.*, buildings and faculty of the University of Louvanium compare favorably with major U.S. state universities; medical and other professional schools are reputed to be remarkably good.) Although an economic elite of native businessmen, skilled workers, small proprietors and farmers was created, there is no intellectual elite, and what there is, is neither educated nor experienced enough to administer a vast country. The Belgian belief—a sort of primitive Marxism—seems to have been

¹*It might have been better if the white man had never come to Africa. Cf. John Stuart Mill: "I am not aware that any community has the right to force another to be civilized." But here I am concerned with what happened after the fait accompli of the original conquest.*

²*These provisions were rather paternalistic. But as a first stage in helping a pre-industrial people, they seem appropriate.*

that economic welfare would by itself perpetuate the *status quo* or create an orderly change. As a result there is no post-tribal political tradition.

When riots occurred in Leopoldville under native leadership, the Belgians, rudely shocked, allowed themselves to be pushed into granting almost immediate independence to the Congo. The inconsistency committed—not preparing for, but then hastily granting, independence—was to exact a greater toll in human suffering than either of the two other possibilities (timely preparation for independence; or refusal to grant it without delay for preparation) might have cost.

The hastily improvised Belgian preparation for independence consisted in getting the assent of most of the leading politicians to a totally unworkable and unrealistic "*loi fondamentale*" (constitution) and in preparing a number of covenants providing for Belgian financial and technical assistance.¹ Finally, added opportunities for higher learning were offered. However, it will take some years before the first native physicians, lawyers, etc. can enter practice.

Patrice Lumumba (a detribalized former clerk) was elected Premier, and Joseph Kasavubu (a leader who, despite mixed ancestry—he is half Chinese—is the chief of the Bakongo tribe, important in the Leopoldville region) President. Shortly thereafter the *Force Publique* (army) rebelled against its Belgian officers, who were dismissed by Lumumba. Former indigenous non-commissioned officers, clerks, etc. were hastily promoted to generals, and, in some cases, did their best to hold the bands of rebellious soldiers in check. The pay of these soldiers was greatly and repeatedly increased. But they remained a danger to, rather than a protection for, the Congo. Incapable of military action without their former officers, they remain quite capable of robbing, intimidating and dominating the unarmed population.²

Widespread attacks on whites, mainly by native soldiers, followed, and Belgium reoccupied the country to protect its nationals. Faced with the

¹The *loi fondamentale* was regarded with publicly expressed misgivings by Tshombe and Kasavubu, among others. At best it was a provisional scaffolding to permit the construction of a Congolese constitution.

Belgian reoccupation, the Lumumba government appealed for U.N. help. This was given, and the Belgian troops were replaced by U.N. troops, mainly of African origin. Katanga, the most developed and industrialized part of the Congo, remained relatively quiet³, and declared its secession from what looked then like anarchy. The Katanga assembly ratified a Katanga independence declaration and elected Moise Tshombe President of Katanga (August 8, 1960).

With the assent of the assembly, Tshombe declared that, in view of the peaceful progress of Katanga, there was no need for U.N. troops. However, having been assured by the U.N. that there would be no interference in internal affairs, Tshombe, expressing his confidence, allowed a Swedish contingent to enter (August 12, 1960)⁴. Perhaps by replacing the Belgian troops Tshombe hoped to demonstrate that his power did not rest, as had been alleged, on the Belgian army. Peaceful progress in Katanga continued for nearly a year—until the U.N. attack (see below).

The Katanga assembly itself had been elected May 22, 1960 (when deputies for the national parliament also were elected). Tshombe's party (Conakat) obtained a plurality of assemblymen. With the help of ten independent deputies, he obtained a majority for his government. This majority has been maintained against the opposition Balubakat party.⁵ Both parties largely represent tribal groupings. However, there are considerable intra-tribal splits. Though a majority of Balubas in Katanga oppose Tshombe and are traditionally

²Reduction of the size of this army (and of the cost) and retraining to fashion it into a small, dependable and non-political force capable of military action, is a major task for any government. White officers will be needed for a while as specialists and instructors. The reduction in numbers is political dynamite at present, and requires an economy that can absorb the veterans.

³Though intra- and inter-tribal fighting broke out in the north of the Province.

⁴The U.N. assurances were conveyed personally by Dag Hammarskjöld. They were not kept.

⁵In the assembly the Conakat (Tshombe's party) had 25 members (a plurality), the Balubakat 18. The remaining members (there are altogether 60) belonged to smaller parties, were independents, or belonged to purely local groups. Of these 10 supported immediately (and continued to support) Tshombe's government, which thus disposes of 35 votes. The opposition group is split into a number of factions.

hostile to his Lunda tribe, several groupings of Balubas are friendly to him, others neutral. The Baluba of Kasai Province, under Albert Kalonji (now jailed in Leopoldville) were allied to Tshombe at one time. The Balubas located in the Kamina region support Tshombe outright. The leader of the Katanga opposition Balubas is Jason Sendwe, now a minister of the Leopoldville government.

The original purpose of the U.N. differed greatly from its later actions. The late Dag Hammarskjöld, then Secretary General of the U.N., stated upon the entry of the U.N. troops into the Congo that they would not become "a party to any internal conflict," and on August 9, 1960, the Security Council resolved: "The U.N. forces in the Congo will not be a party to, or in any way intervene in, or be used to influence the outcome of internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise." This original U.N. attitude, made explicit in these promises, persuaded President Tshombe to permit the peaceful entry of U.N. troops into Katanga. (The promises were broken.) Throughout this period, Tshombe also declared his support for Congo unity, provided a federal system was instituted. In November, 1960, he met with Central Government leaders and "general agreement" was reached. Among the participants at this conference was Cyrille Adoula, now Premier of the Central Government.

Meanwhile, Premier Lumumba had begun to act erratically and to perpetrate a number of outrages.¹ He instigated and supported wanton attacks against whites, including U.N. personnel; and the murder of actual, potential and fancied opponents.² He was dismissed by President Kasavubu September 5, but refused to "accept" the dismissal. Placed under U.N. protection, he attempted to continue as Premier, "dismissed" President Kasavubu and assembled some mem-

bers of Parliament. Illegally convoked, and without a quorum, the lower house "invalidated" both dismissals. (The Senate also assembled without vestiges of legality and, boycotted by anti-Lumumba members, declared its confidence in Lumumba). The Congo thus had the Ileo³ government which President Kasavubu named to succeed Lumumba, but which was not tested in Parliament, and thus not legally established; and the Lumumba government, legally instituted and legally dismissed by the President and sheltered by the U.N. Anarchy prevailed until an army colonel, Joseph Mobutu, seized control and thereafter, with Kasavubu's assent, named a committee of college graduates to run the Congo.

Seeing power slip from him, Lumumba secretly left his U.N. protected residence and attempted to join his supporters who had seized power in Stanleyville, where Antoine Gizenga, a vice premier in Lumumba's dismissed cabinet, declared himself Premier of the Congo December 13. Bereft of U.N. protection, Lumumba was intercepted by Mobutu's forces and arrested on the basis of warrants signed by Kasavubu and the appropriate judicial authorities. (The U.N. had previously prevented serving of these warrants.) On January 18, 1961, Lumumba was transferred to prison in Katanga; he is said to have attempted a second escape there and was killed.⁴

On February 21, 1961 the Security Council authorized U.N. troops to use force to prevent civil war. A week later the Kasavubu-nominated Premier of the Central Government, Ileo, Moise Tshombe, and Albert Kalonji, the leader of Kasai Province, signed an agreement opposing communism and U.N. tutelage. Ileo had signed a pact with Tshombe in Brazzaville in September 1960, in which he received Katanga's support and Tshombe stated that Katanga had seceded only to resist the Lumumba dictatorship. The U.N. con-

¹Local rumor explains Lumumba as a hashish addict. The addictive plants grow outside Leopoldville.

²See documents presented to the U.N. by President Kasavubu. A/47 11/Add 2 p.p. 42, 46 March 20, 1961.

³Ileo was the President of the Senate.

⁴A U.N. commission which attempted to inquire into his death was not allowed to enter Katanga. It concluded anyway that Lumumba was murdered. Its "evidence" would not be acceptable in any court of law and does not inspire confidence in U.N. legal practices—however much one may suspect that the conclusion was correct.

tinued to protect the pro-Lumumba factions in the Congo and to obstruct the functioning of alternative governments. Insisting that civil war threatened in and about Katanga, on April 1 (All Fool's Day) the U.N. sent Gurkha troops to Katanga, citing the U.N. resolution of February 21. Thus U.N. forces in Katanga were built up, although the Province was peaceful.

On April 24, a second conference of Congo leaders took place in Coquilhatville to implement the Tananarive (March 1961) decisions. However, according to Tshombe, the assembled leaders decided to ignore these decisions which they had themselves taken and to work out a more centralized administration. The Central Government leaders claim that it was Tshombe who refused to honor his word. The Tananarive accords were vague enough to permit inconsistent interpretations to be held in good faith. Further, the disagreement between Tshombe and the Central Government leaders might well have been fostered by the U.N. threats and actions against Katanga: if the U.N. could subjugate Katanga, the non-Katanga leaders would see less reason to negotiate than they did when Katanga was strong. And the Katanga leaders would grow more suspicious than ever.

Feeling betrayed by both his former partners and the U.N., and reasoning that negotiations were impossible under the circumstances, Tshombe attempted to leave the conference. He was forcibly detained (April 25), arrested without warrant and kept under harsh conditions. On May 29 he was brought to Leopoldville where (June 22) he was released after having been compelled to promise to cease his opposition to a centralized administration.¹ Back in Elisabethville,

¹No attempt was made by the U.N. to extend the protection to Tshombe that was extended to Lumumba and others.



Tshombe refused to consider himself obligated by a promise made under duress.

On September 13, 1961 U.N. troops finally attempted a military coup in Elisabethville; they were frustrated after considerable fighting. On October 13, a formal cease-fire was established and ratified October 24 by the U.N. Secretariat. The U.N. recognized Katanga's right to protect itself from Central Government attacks. Prisoners were exchanged. The U.N. did not attempt to impose further conditions about mercenaries.

However, on November 24 the U.N. Security Council once more approved use of force to deport "mercenaries" from Katanga. After a considerable buildup, the fighting started again on December 5.² This time the U.N. troops succeeded in sacking Elisabethville. Tshombe appealed to President Kennedy to use his influence to halt the destruction of the city. Under the protection of the consular corps of Elisabethville, he went to Kitona (December 21) where, under the auspices of U.N. functionaries and of the American Ambassador, he met with Premier Adoula.³ The Kitona agreement was signed and later ratified in principle by the Katanga assembly. Since Kitona a *de facto* armistice has prevailed in Elisabethville, although sporadic arbitrary arrests by U.N. troops continue. At the present writing, considerable progress has been made in negotiations among Congo leaders to implement and interpret the agreement. The Soviet bloc has tried to use the U.N. for further attacks on Katanga, but has not succeeded so far.

²As mentioned above, it is unclear who in this second attack started the actual shooting. Military buildup had preceded it on both sides for ostensibly defensive reasons.

³Cyrille Adoula, a member of the Belgian Socialist party, having been nominated by the President, had been elected Premier by the Congo parliament (Aug. 2, 1961) convoked by Kasavubu, and assembled under U.N. protection in the University buildings of Louvanium (Leopoldville). The Katanga deputies did not participate.



YOUNG CASUALTY: *The heavy casualties caused by the fighting included many non-combatants like the small boy shown above (photo, top). Even the rescue of the wounded was hazardous (photo, center). Plainly marked Red Cross vehicles were fired upon. Missionaries, like these members of the Congregation of the Holy Spirit (photo, bottom) helped care for the wounded.*



17

...THE DEAD



MORTAR VICTIM: *Many of the dead, like this victim of a UN mortar shell (photo top), had to be left where they fell while the fighting raged. Even Catholic nuns aided in the collection and burial of the dead (photo, center). Some had to be buried in hastily-dug mass graves. A priest (photo, bottom) conducts a graveside burial service for four of the dead.*

IV ANALYSIS

1. HISTORICAL

Our State Department credits the prompt response of the U.N. to Lumumba's distress call, July 14, 1960, with avoiding a Korea-like situation in the Congo. No doubt this situation has been avoided. One may question, however, whether because of, in spite of, or regardless of U.N. intervention.

The U.N. intervened in Korea but did not there avoid the situation it is said to have avoided by its intervention in the Congo. The difference between the two situations thus cannot lie in the mere fact of U.N. intervention. Indeed, there appear to be differences which probably had more influence on the outcome and have nothing to do with the U.N. In the first place, the Korea situation started as a conflict between the great powers, though fought at first by the instrumentality of smaller powers under their influence. In this conflict, the big powers were logistically about equally able to support the small powers (North and South Korea) which did the initial fighting. If anything Russia and its ally, China, had some logistic advantage over the U.S. and North Korea was better prepared than South Korea. Finally, the U.S. had declared that South Korea was outside its defense perimeter. All of this encouraged the Russians to prompt and back the attack by North Korea, which we decided to resist, carrying with us a majority of U.N. members and (largely by accident) the U.N. banner.

The situation in the Congo was quite different. The logistic advantage was on our side. A civil war would have been likely to end in the defeat of the Russian-backed party. Such a defeat might well have endangered Russia's precarious foothold in such places as Ghana, Guinea and Egypt. It is doubtful, therefore, that the Russians would have seriously committed themselves. And without a great deal of Russian support, there was not much chance that a war would have taken

place. Hence one may doubt that the U.N. intervention actually prevented a civil war, or an indirect war of the great powers'. It could even be maintained, with some justice, that the presence of the U.N., divided as it is into opposing and intriguing factions, brought civil war nearer than it would otherwise have been. Certainly some U.N. actions came near to provoking such an outcome.

But this is water over the dam. One cannot say for certain what would have happened without the U.N. However, from this uncertainty, it does not follow either that things would have been worse or that they would have been better¹.

There is no evidence then (other than the *post hoc propter hoc* fallacy) that the U.N. action prevented in the Congo what the U.N. action did not prevent in Korea. Even if one grants the usefulness of the original U.N. dispatch of troops to the Congo, one may still feel that what started well degenerated in execution and through added directives. I believe that the facts force this conclusion on any objective observer.

Parts of the U.N. operation were and remain useful to the world and to the Congo. But the U.N. also intervened in Congolese domestic affairs (on behalf of those of its members who were so disposed), and contrary to explicit promises attempted to force the surrender of Katanga to the Central Government by military aggression. In this action, the original purpose was betrayed and a disservice rendered to the Congo and the world.

Had they succeeded, the actions of U.N. personnel and troops would have led to (a) a peacefully communized Congo; (b) a Congo dominated by Ghana and its allies; or (c) if there was enough resistance to these threats, to civil war. If both communism and civil war were avoided, this is due to (1) the defeat by the Congolese of the U.N. attempt to sustain the Lumumba government;

¹It is unlikely that the Russians would risk a major war—let alone an atomic one—for the Congo. They have not done so for the sake of more important matters elsewhere. Experience also indicates that local wars need not spread.

²There are, of course, many instances in the past of neutralization and pacification by neutral powers not organized as "United Nations".

(2) the defeat of Ghanaian intervention by the Congolese (without U.N. support); (3) the defeat of the original U.N. attack on Katanga and the continued Katangese resistance.

It was not Mr. Dayal, the U.N. representative, who opposed the Lumumba-Gizenga government even when it was engaged in obviously illegal acts. It was President Kasavubu, over Mr. Dayal's strenuous opposition and attempts to interfere, who dismissed Lumumba despite the threat of direct U.N. intervention. Lumumba did not regain power thereafter, owing to Kasavubu's shrewdness and Colonel Mobutu's decisiveness, supported by Tshombe's stand: secession rather than knuckling under to Lumumba. Lumumba's own errors and those of his foreign supporters also deserve credit. The U.N. does not. The most it did was to recognize what had happened, and this with considerable reluctance.

The U.N. must not be regarded as a metaphysical entity hovering above national and ideological disputes: its policies are shaped by little else. To disregard this fact is to do a disservice both to one's own nation and to the U.N., which does not benefit from idealization, but might be helped by realistic analysis. U.N. policies necessarily depend on the policies of the nations constituting it, and change with any change in the balance of power among them. The Charter of the U.N. has no independent interpreters, nor is it self-enforcing. It is interpreted and enforced to the extent and in the way that the national policies of the member nations permit. American policy, in pursuing its goals, may try to influence the U.N. If successful in this, it may strive to attain its goals with the help of, or through the U.N. But if our influence in the U.N. is not sufficient to prevent actions contrary to our goals and ideals, we certainly should not support these actions merely because they are labelled "U.N. actions." To do so would be to attempt to defeat ourselves. There is no such obligation, as all other nations recognize. Some nations — *e.g.* Egypt *in re* Suez Canal, India *in re* Goa, Indonesia *in re* Dutch Guinea, let alone the communist nations — simply violate charters and agreements when they feel they can get away

with it. I do not propose that we imitate them. But we are quite entitled to give or withhold support to any degree, without violating the Charter or its spirit.

Developments up to the present suggest caution with regard to future U.N. actions in the Congo. So far, U.N. activity there has probably fostered as much violence as it has prevented. The U.N., came as, but hardly acted as a force for peace. The U.N. forces started the two biggest military actions which have taken place in the Congo.

Not least, the behavior of U.N. occupation troops toward the civilian population in Katanga compares unfavorably with, say, the behavior of the Indian troops in Goa, or of American troops in Japan.

Contrary to widespread optimistic impressions, the U.N. actions in Katanga cannot be considered as part of an over-all effort — justifiable or not — to unify or pacify the Congo by force, for all the military actions of the U.N. have been directed exclusively against Katanga. Yet, in other parts of the Congo (*e.g.* the Stanleyville region) leftist factions actively opposed the Central Government and received open foreign support. They even set up a rival government, claiming jurisdiction beyond the region ruled independently from the Central Government. Unlike the Katanga government, these leftists had not been elected to their offices, and they maintained their power by open terrorism. The U.N. remained "neutral" with respect to them.

Thus, the military activity of the U.N. in Katanga contrasts with its passivity in regard to (a) the political secession of, and opposition to the Central Government of the Stanleyville region; (b) the barbarities — murder of missionaries; murder and torture of natives; murder of U.N. soldiers on peaceful missions — committed by the Stanleyville troops. I cannot see why the elimination of "mercenaries," accused of no crime except being in Katanga, justifies harsh military action of which the civilian population was the main victim; whereas the protection of the civilian population against a communist-inspired murderous rabble in Stanleyville, Kivu and North

Katanga called for no action whatever. Where and when the Katanga government was allowed to function, no disorders or anti-white atrocities comparable to those occurring in the rest of the Congo have so far taken place. However, the U.N. prevented the Katanga government from functioning in much of the northern region. It has opened these regions to invasion by mobs of soldiers originating in Stanleyville and elsewhere outside Katanga. As a result, numerous natives, as well as white missionaries and priests, have been murdered.¹

At the present writing, the Central Government of Premier Adoula seems about to gain some control over the Stanleyville region and Oriental Province. This is not because of U.N. action; there was none. If, however, it be attributed to the U.N.'s patience — *i.e.*, inaction — why did the U.N. not feel that similar patience would have healed the breach between Katanga and the Central Government? Patience with Stanleyville was maintained in the face of many murders and atrocities. Katanga (particularly those regions in which the U.N. attack took place) was calm. Patience in Katanga would have spared the population much unnecessary suffering. Yet the U.N. was patient only with Stanleyville, where intervention could have saved the population from unbelievably savage acts.²

The State Department insists that the ability of the Adoula government to deal with Gizenga depended on a U.N. victory in Katanga: *i.e.*, the ability of the Central Government to deal with communists and lawless bands rests on the defeat of law-abiding anti-communists. On the face of

it, this contention is odd. It seems odder still if we remember that the original Katanga secession was reaction to Lumumba's lawless and pro-communist government. This secession was recognized by President Kasavubu and his Central Government, who were in explicit accord with the Katanga government.

As for the U.N., far from helping, it probably delayed the establishment of a democratic and federated Congo republic. The U.N. (a) first helped the pro-communist and lawless factions actively (Lumumba); (b) then indulged them passively (Gizenga); (c) and finally attacked the orderly and anti-communist factions. By promising and actually delivering military (albeit unsuccessful) support as an *alternative* to negotiations, the U.N. delayed peaceful agreement between Katanga and the rest of the Congo, and fostered civil war.

How much of the U.N.'s unilateral belligerence in the Congo must be attributed to intrigues within the U.N., how much to incompetence and prejudice, will be for historians to find out. Certainly State Department support for these U.N. Katanga actions was not in the American interest. The explanation for the State Department's support lies in (a) incompetence; (b) an unjustifiable feeling (no one would be willing to present it as a doctrine that U.N. decisions must always be supported — even when originally opposed by the State Department;³ (c) unwillingness to engage in a policy that would separate us from the "uncommitted" Afro-Asian nations. In effect, such an unwillingness means that the U.S. gives up its independence in favor of the African nations: since we seem unwilling to separate ourselves from them and they do not follow us, we follow them. (Indeed, they already tax us via U.N. assessments.) Those who are opposed to imperialism (*i.e.*, the loss of national independence to foreign nations) on principle, as I am, should support national independence not only for African nations but even for the United States.

¹ Senator Thomas J. Dodd, in a speech to the Senate, has pointed out that some at least of the troops who ran amok in north Katanga were from units that were at least nominally part of the (central) Congolese army. They were called "Gizengist" and "Stanleyville" only after their depredations became public knowledge. The units that entered Albertville, north Katanga, were partly transported by U. N. planes and greeted by U. N. officials (including Conor Cruise O'Brien) as "a liberating army."

² There was no doubt, moreover, of the willingness of the Katanga government to negotiate with Adoula's Central Government—whereas Gizenga's Stanleyville regime had made it clear that it intended to replace the Central Government.

³ No other nation shares this feeling. The majority of the U. N. has opposed—at times actively—the blind support of the U. N. favored in the U. S. State Department.

2. THE U.N. PURPOSE IN KATANGA

THE first U.N. attack on Katanga took place September 13, 1961 in Elisabethville and was led by Dr. Conor Cruise O'Brien.¹ He must have been authorized and possibly instructed to organize it by the U.N. representative in Leopoldville, Rajeshwar Dayal, who apparently thought that various U.N. resolutions authorizing force to prevent civil war impelled such an attack. However, these resolutions authorized attack only when pre-emptive, *i.e.* necessary to prevent civil war, or for self defense. An attack by the U.N. acting for one party (the Central Government) in a potential civil war when this party, however willing, was obviously not capable of attacking, and the other (Katanga) had no reason to, can hardly be called preventive. Wasn't the U.N. attack itself the very thing the U.N. was there to prevent?

There was no indication of impending civil war in Katanga. Except for the U.N. military posture, the situation was admittedly peaceful. No civil war occurred after the U.N.'s attack was beaten back by the Katanga army. To this day, the only warlike actions in Katanga have been those initiated by the U.N. They remain the only major military operations in the Congo.

A second alleged purpose of the U.N.'s surprise attack was to force the elimination of "mercenaries", *i.e.* of the white officers and specialists in the Katanga army. I cannot see how warfare to obtain compliance with this demand could be justified even if the demand itself were legitimate. But I don't think it is.

By what right can the U.N. prescribe whom the Katanga government can or cannot employ in its army? Nothing in the U.N. Charter gives the U.N. such authority. Certainly the U.N. is not empowered to make laws: it can no more prescribe whom the Congo — or any part thereof — can employ than it can tell the United States whom to employ. Nor could the U. N. order Texas not to secede, or attack it for hiring Mexican "mercenaries". It is up to each government to determine whom to employ.² If Katanga were regarded as an independent or semi-independent entity, or one in the process of defining its relationship to the rest of the Congo — and the U.N. troops peacefully entered Katanga recognizing as much and promising not to interfere with this condition — certainly the U.N. had no more right to ban employment of foreign (or white) soldiers than it has to ban France's Foreign Legion,³ or Negro soldiers in the United States.

²Debellatio (as in post-Nazi Germany) is the one exception, clearly inapplicable here.

³Actually the Foreign Legion consists of foreigners in the main, whereas the "mercenaries" were a very small proportion of the Katanga army. Next, the Vatican may be asked to fire its Swiss "mercenaries." No one, incidentally, asked Prime Minister Nkrumah to fire his British officers.

¹Some persons in Elisabethville, including the Rector of the local university Dr. Frankiel, told me that when preparations for the attack were observed, Dr. O'Brien offered his word of honor that no surprise attack would occur. (The attack took place without warning.) However, he might have been misunderstood. I did not have time enough to make sure.

UTILITIES KNOCKED OUT: A civilian catching water from drainpipe in Elisabethville during fighting. U.N. bombardment disrupted utility services.



The U.N. demand was clearly aimed at satisfying a Central Government (and even more, an extra-Congolese African) desire to weaken and eliminate the Katanga government by weakening its army. The Katanga army had always been staffed by white officers — as had the rest of the Congo army. Thus, the “mercenaries” were nothing new. Katanga had not dismissed all its white officers (as had the rest of the Congo) at Lumumba’s orders, and it replaced many of those who left. Far from constituting a threat of civil war or disorder, these “mercenaries” helped to avoid it: they kept the Katanga army disciplined; it never degenerated into a murderous rabble, as did other sectors of the Congo army.¹

The U.N. assertion that the objective of the Elisabethville attack was to prevent civil war is factually wrong. The second objective — elimination of mercenaries — is morally and legally unjustifiable.² Further, the military attack undertaken ostensibly to eliminate the “mercenaries” was a means so cruelly disproportionate to the aim as to suggest either that the U.N. function-

aries were quite mad or that the issue of mercenaries was raised to hide an unavowed, more substantial aim.

Abundant positive evidence indicates that the alleged aims were but public relations disguises. The actual objective of the U.N. attack was to force Tshombe’s surrender and to establish the rule over Katanga by the Central Government.

In its actions, the U.N. has conceded as much, though it was thought wise to deny publicly its military intervention in Congolese domestic affairs. U.N. planes admittedly conveyed Egyde Bocheley-Davidson to Elisabethville at the time of the September attack. Bocheley-Davidson was admittedly sent to Elisabethville as “commissioner” of the Central Government to replace the elected government of Katanga headed by Moise Tshombe. He never went beyond the Elisabethville airport: he spent two days there waiting for the U.N. to conquer Katanga. When it became clear that the U.N. could not even safely get him into Elisabethville, and the U.N. attack was being beaten back, Bocheley-Davidson returned to Leopoldville, again by U.N. plane.

This happened despite Dag Hammarskjöld’s explicit statement “. . . the United Nations Force cannot be used on behalf of the central Government to subdue or to force the provincial government to a specific line of action. *It further follows that United Nations facilities cannot be used, for example, to transport civilian or military representatives, under the authority of the central Government, to Katanga against the decision of the Katanga provincial government.*”³ No doubt Hammarskjöld was both right and in good faith. There is no doubt either, unfortunately, that his good faith and that of the Katanga government, which relied on his word, were betrayed.

¹ *The Katanga army with the help of white officers and specialists was also engaged in quelling disorders in the north of Katanga. It has been charged — I suspect with some justice, though I have no definite evidence — that the methods used were harsh. Yet inter- and intra-tribal fighting has been stopped, where it has been stopped at all, only by harsh methods. Though not sufficient, these seem necessary; they may reduce the ultimate cost in death and suffering more than more lenient methods.*

The Baluba unrest in North Katanga was acknowledged by the Central Government and the U.N., who sent Jason Sendwe, a Baluba leader, to quell it by persuasion. Sendwe’s appeal was ineffective. By promising President Tshombe that it would reestablish law and order, and also close the territory to invasion from forces outside Katanga, the U.N. got the Katanga army to withdraw from North Katanga. Neither promise was kept. There have been rampages of mobs of Congolese soldiers who robbed, burned and killed freely — and without fear of punishment — in the undefended territory. Numerous indigenous people were slain as well as a number of white missionaries and priests. The intra-tribal murders of opponents by the Jeunesse Balubakat terrorists continue to this day, (see White Book of the Katanga government for part of the story) as do the murders in North Katanga by Stanleyville soldiers of the Congolese army. Neither the Central Government nor the U.N. has shown much interest in combatting, punishing or preventing these.

² *If the U.N. passes a resolution, it does not become ipso facto legitimate. Even when it is, it is disregarded if the Soviet Union (Hungary) or Indian (Kashmir) does not like it. U.N. resolutions are enforced only against the very weak.*

³ *United Nations document, S/4417/Add. 6, 12 August 1960 pp. 3-4.*

Why a central government not itself communist commissioned the former agriculture minister in Gizenga's pro-communist Stanleyville cabinet to rule Katanga, I do not know. Bocheley-Davidson was selected even though his unsavory past — apart from political acts, he was charged with murder and torture — had been publicly exposed by President Kasavubu himself.¹ When I asked him, Premier Adoula conceded the above facts. He did not explain or attempt to justify them.

Even if the prospective commissioner had been a man of saintly and democratic disposition, the attempt to install him leaves no doubt that the U.N. objective went far beyond the elimination of "mercenaries" or the avoidance of civil war. The U.N. fought to replace the elected native Katanga government by a non-native, non-elected commissioner. When the Central Government chose a notorious pro-communist the U.N. did not demur and transported him to Elisabethville. Thus, its victory would have meant the rule of Katanga by a pro-communist commissioner, charged with atrocities by the government that sent him. We can thank Providence and Katanga troops, including "mercenaries",² for the defeat of the U.N.

State Department sources stress that Katanga and the Congo are now at peace under non-communist rule, and try to take credit for this result. Yet the evidence shows beyond a doubt that, had the U.N. — supported by the State Department³ — won its battles in Katanga, this most important part of the Congo would now be under pro-communist rule. *Thus, the State Department perversely is taking credit for the defeat of its policies.* This testifies to the talents of its domestic public relations staff but not to the abilities of those who made the policy decisions.

At the risk of taking it perhaps more seriously than it deserves, let us scrutinize the merits of the "mercenary" issue apart from its service as pre-

text for aggression. The requested sudden removal of whites from the Katanga army would have disorganized it and left that province at the mercy of the U.N. and of the Central Government, hostile to Katanga. Though Tshombe has wide support, Katanga no more than the rest of the Congo can dispense with white specialists; less actually: industrialized Katanga depends on educated specialists more than the agricultural regions of much of the rest of the former Belgian Congo. Yet, although the U.N. never asked the Leopoldville government to get rid of foreign specialists, it insistently asked the Katanga government to do so. No such demands were made on Stanleyville either. To be sure, their specialists were not called "mercenaries", but "experts" (including Soviet and Eastern bloc pilots, *et al.*).⁴ Had Tshombe heeded the U.N., the army of Katanga, like the Congolese army, would have degenerated into a rabble incapable of military actions.⁵ And, since there is an endemic danger of tribal warfare, the U.N. request was irresponsible as well.

However, the request for the firing of "mercenaries" was only a pretext for the U.N. attack that was to strip Katanga of power. Tshombe was asked to surrender first and negotiate afterwards.

As far as is known, this policy is no longer being pursued. It was defeated despite U.S. support. This was one reason for abandoning it. Possibly, too, cooler heads prevailed among the local U.N. representatives since Messrs. Dayal and O'Brien left. I hope, too, that wiser counsel prevails in our State Department now. But rather than white-wash past errors, we should learn from them. Those who refuse to remember the past, are, as Santayana says, condemned to repeat it.

¹ U.N. document A 4711 Add 2, March 20, 1961. pp. 62, 68, 73.


² Perhaps a suitable reward for the "mercenaries" is still in order.

³ And by American money, planes and material.

⁴ The post-Lumumba Congolese governments (not Adoula, but Kasavubu and Mobutu) had the good sense to get rid of the more suspect "experts", though there was no U.N. demand for it.

⁵ An official attempt by the Central Government army to invade Katanga ended in heedless flight, compensated for by raping and robbing women, particularly whites, upon the return to the bases. (The U.N. neither stopped the unsuccessful invasion nor the successful rapes and robberies.)

V SOME U.N. ACTIVITIES IN KATANGA



BOMBED CHURCH: *Many churches suffered bomb damage. Above, the roof of a Catholic church ripped open by UN bombing.*

1. THE BLACKLIST

UNDER the administration of Dr. Conor Cruise O'Brien, the U.N. tried to rule Katanga even while attacking it. Direct pressure on persons to get out of Katanga, on pain of arrest and punishment by the U.N., compelled many to leave. Since U.N. soldiers had committed murders and other terroristic acts by this time (see the Appendix), the threat carried weight. O'Brien thus arbitrarily removed civil servants, executives, lawyers, journalists, and professors from the local university.

In these deportations, civil rights and equitable, let alone legal, procedures were ignored. I do not know how O'Brien compiled his blacklist. But the fact is indisputable that the U.N. had a list of whites to be deported and did deport many of

them by threat of violence. None of the blacklisted persons was given a hearing. None was informed of the charge against him. In some cases the persons concerned were themselves told to leave. In others, the organizations employing them—such as the Union Minière, the University of Katanga, the Provincial Government—were asked to fire them on pain of themselves being obstructed in their functions by the U.N.¹

Americans who in the past have protested blacklists in the U.S. have not protested the U.N. blacklist perhaps because the American press did not report it conspicuously. Yet the U.N. procedure should shock any supporter of civil liberties—and of the U.N. I am not proud of our domestic blacklist procedures. Yet at least, (a) charges

(though too often with unsatisfactory evidence) against the person to be blacklisted were published, and he usually had a hearing in which, (though often with inadequate procedural safeguards), he could defend himself; (b) at most, employment in a particular industry became temporarily closed to him. In contrast, (a) the U.N. published no charges against the blacklisted persons, presented no evidence, held no hearings, and permitted no defense; (b) the persons blacklisted by the U.N. not only lost employment but were deported, and frequently imprisoned before deportation. The U.N. in Katanga has acted in total disregard of all civil and human rights. Americans certainly should protest these actions by an organization which they support to uphold human rights.

In addition to blacklisting, arresting and deporting an assortment of persons that had incurred its displeasure, the U.N. also removed (in accordance with resolutions of its deliberative bodies) the major civilian advisors, administrators and civil servants from the provincial administration. These were Belgians, often with many years of service. Now, the Belgian colonial administration failed to train Congolese for administrative functions. Certainly the Belgian government must be blamed for not preparing the population for independence and yet allowing itself to be pressured into granting it without delay. But Belgian civil servants were willing to stay, particularly in Katanga where there had been no anti-white demonstrations and no mob rule. And they are the people most competent to fill civil service positions until natives are ready to take over. For the time being they are needed in Katanga as well as in the rest of the Congo.²

¹ It was alleged to me that the murder of M. Derriks, Director of the Union Minière, by U.N. Ethiopian soldiers carried out a U.N. threat. But no evidence was given me, and I prefer not to believe the charge unless proved. (No U.N. investigation of the murder was made. No one has been charged. The district attorney has not been allowed to interrogate U.N. suspects.)

² The Belgo-Congolese agreement upon independence called for the civil service employees to stay under the Congolese government. It was rescinded by Lumumba.

Tshombe therefore rightly asked them to stay—and to prepare their successors. (At the Katanga University in Elisabethville, eager native students are now preparing, under the guidance of Belgian professors, for careers in administration, medicine, law, engineering, etc.) In compelling many Belgian civil servants to leave, the U.N. could have brought about the same chaos and mob rule in Katanga that Lumumba had brought to the Congo. This policy, like so many others, may have been pursued simply because of doctrinaire silliness; or deliberately, to make the administration of Katanga as inefficient as that of the rest of the Congo.

President Tshombe is now largely advised and helped by those who were assistants or secretaries to his former advisors and in too low a classification to make the U.N. blacklist.

2. THE BALUBA CAMP

THE endemic tension among various Baluba groups led, after the Belgian withdrawal, to the murder of a number of conservative and pro-Katanga Baluba chiefs by the *Jeunesse Balubakat*, a terrorist anti-Katanga tribal group. Other intra- and inter-tribal disorders occurred.³ The Katanga gendarmerie intervened with the harsh methods used by the Belgians before them. The U.N. thereupon cordoned off the north of Katanga (the Baluba territory) from the Katanga government forces—but unfortunately and contrary to written promise not from Stanleyville forces, which entered via Kivu. Meanwhile, in the industrial south of Katanga, too, strife occurred between the Balubas and other tribes, sparked probably by the situation in the north. Bad, though not violent, relations had prevailed for a while, partly because a disproportionate number of skilled workers and of the more prosperous

³ See the "White Book" of the Katanga government. Note that the Balubas in Kasai are friendly to Tshombe and were allied to him for a while. The Katanga Balubas are divided. Many of them were, some still are, allied with Tshombe.

inhabitants of industrial Katanga are Balubas.¹ Some violence occurred at that point.

In response to this situation, Dr. O'Brian established a camp for Balubas, protected by U.N. troops on the outskirts of Elisabethville. Originally 300 persons were so sheltered, now there are 40,000. I visited the camp accompanied by Swedish officers and soldiers with submachine guns at the ready. (I was told that otherwise the security of visitors could not be insured.) The 40,000 Balubas are allowed to come and go at any time. Some Balubas make use of this freedom, and of their U.N.-protected redoubt, to make robbing and stealing forays on the town. The native quarter had to be protected by Katanga soldiers against these raids. Non-Balubas can enter the camp only by U.N. permission. Police are not allowed to enter; thus, in effect, the campers have immunity from arrest and prosecution. The Balubas have, without U.N. objection, demolished nearby villas to use the bricks and furniture for their own huts.

The camp is totally dominated by the *Jeunesse Balubakat*, which terrorizes its inhabitants. No protection is extended by the U.N. against this terror group; intra-camp murders are common and unpunished. The campers are being indoctrinated in tribalistic, pro-Soviet and anti-Katanga doctrines by the *Jeunesse Balubakat*. Various camp streets have been given the names of communist leaders: (Avenue Khrushchev, etc.) The *Jeunesse Balubakat* also engages in military drills. No other schooling takes place. Although the majority of the campers are Christians, no provision for religious services has been made. This camp is supported directly and indirectly by U.S. grants.

It is hard to see how all this can help solve the inter- or intra-tribal problems.² It has in fact intensified, perpetuated and magnified them. According to witnesses, the U.N. sent out cars equipped with loudspeakers to spread the news that the Balubas were in danger, and to offer the

protection of the camp. No better way to generate panic in a tense situation could have been devised. Many Balubas in the Elisabethville region left their jobs to live in the camp. Further, the very fact that the camp accepted any Baluba without asking why he came, or questioning whether he was in actual danger, attracted many who simply wanted to live on handouts. Others did not want to become isolated. Still others feared incurring the displeasure of *Jeunesse Balubakat* by staying behind.

Conditions in the camp are miserable to Western eyes. But many primitive Congo tribes still prefer leisure to the comforts that can be achieved by giving it up. (This, in some measure, is characteristic of non-industrial and, particularly, of primitive cultures.) Hence, the camp may be more attractive to them than it would appear to people conditioned by an industrial civilization.

The U.N. has done nothing to persuade the campers to go back to their normal occupations and residences. Apart from some fear of their reception by former neighbors, a Baluba family wishing to leave the camp would now be afraid of the revenge of the *Jeunesse Balubakat*, which opposes leaving the camp. Thus the Balubas now, though protected from violence from other tribes, are exposed to no less from other Balubas.³

The camp should be dissolved by reducing the number of Balubas in it at an accelerating rate, while making sure that they can return to their residences in safety. This may be helped temporarily by combined Katangan and U.N. police patrols (e.g. Nigerians). Criminals and accused persons should not be allowed to leave before their cases are settled.⁴ Actually the camp as it now exists works as a training school for hatred, subversion and violence. It will make the reintegration of the residents into Katangan life the more difficult, the longer it continues.

¹ The Balubas are credited with more ambition than other tribes. But I had no time to investigate the origin of the phenomenon.

² Slum residents would not be protected from juvenile gangs by herding them into a camp — and taking the youth gangs along.

³ The favored mutilations — cutting off hands, feet and genitals — occur. The favored method of killing — beating off the flesh of the victim with sharpened bicycle chains — also occurs. The former method is traditional but the latter is considered progressive.

⁴ Some of these operations might well be supervised by the International Red Cross.

LA JEUNESSE BALUBAKAT:
*Armed members of the "Young
Baluba" organization, a terrorist
tribal group whose members, like
those below, live in the Elisabethville
camp, and were reported to have
looted the city during the fighting.*



3. U.N. TROOP DISCIPLINE

Since Dr. O'Brien left, accusing the British—who else?—of having frustrated him, the leadership of the U.N. in Katanga has greatly improved. I have great respect for Mr. Brian Urquhart, the civilian representative of the U.N. in Elisabethville during my stay.¹ I met him all too briefly. There is no better way of suggesting the prevailing situation than to relate why our meeting was so brief in spite of our genuine and mutual wish to canvass the situation at some length together.

Upon a short and friendly encounter, Mr. Urquhart expressed the wish to explain the situation to me—to which I responded with alacrity. The American Consul, Mr. Lewis Hoffacker, was good enough to invite Mr Urquhart and me to his house for drinks. It was understood that this would be the beginning of a conversation Mr. Urquhart and I were to carry on as long as we both felt it to be profitable. Mr. Urquhart did not show up, however; after a while he telephoned to apologize for his lateness, indicating that some “ridiculous business,” which he did not care to discuss over the phone, would detain him a few more minutes. About half an hour later the same explanation and apology were repeated; and so once more. Finally, Mr. Urquhart indicated that he could not come: the “ridiculous business” (still undescribed) was going to hold him up indefinitely.

Thereupon I went to dine with the British Consul, who had expressed the desire to meet with me. About 11 p.m., while still at his residence, I received a distraught call from an acquaintance: a Belgian gynecologist and university professor, who had been my host, as well as several lawyers, the provincial prosecutor and another physician had been arrested at 3 p.m. while officially reconstructing a recent murder. Dr. Questiaux, one of the witnesses, had mentioned the matter to me the previous evening and described the difficulties encountered in obtaining U.N. permission for the judicial reconstruction. However, the permission had finally been granted in writing. The prosecu-

¹Since replaced.

tor was not allowed to interrogate U.N. personnel. He was permitted, though, to have non-U.N. witnesses indicate *in loco* how and where the bodies were found, etc. Yet now the prosecutor, witnesses *et al* had been arrested.

Since the arrest had been made by Ethiopian soldiers, greatly feared by the population, my acquaintance tearfully asked me to intervene and would not accept explanations of my powerlessness. I was told that my mere show of interest might help. I did not feel that an inquiry could do any harm. The British Consul graciously drove me in his car as I attempted to reach various persons. At the U.N. I was told that Mr. Urquhart had just left—and that the arrested persons had been released simultaneously. It was true. Within a short time I saw my gynecologist friend who told me that he had been held from 3 p.m. to 11 p.m. and that Urquhart had immediately tried to get the party released, but, though officially in charge, was unable to persuade his Ethiopian subordinates to let go of their prey. He finally managed, after eight strenuous hours. This was the “ridiculous business” that had prevented Mr. Urquhart from keeping his appointment with me.

The episode, happening when Elisabethville's life was supposed to be normal, suggests that:

- a) The civilian authorities of the U.N. do not actually have full control over their troops. They must negotiate — not order — if they wish to obtain anything.
- b) The city is still terrorized by ignorant and suspicious soldiers hired by the U.N. They arbitrarily arrest people suspect to them, regardless of documents and permissions signed by their own superior.
- c) No provision has been made to discipline these U.N. troops; or to offer any protection to the civilian population against abuses by these troops; or to investigate and adjudicate claimed abuses; or to prevent them; or to punish the soldiers guilty of abuses or unauthorized actions. The arrested persons

had no resort except Mr. Urquhart's fairness. Suppose someone less fair, or even someone less energetic or less willing to sacrifice his time, had been in charge?

Silly arrests are perhaps excusable, though not when continuous and harassing. But should we abet a situation where citizens are left without judicial remedy for them? How can the U.N. account for depriving the residents of Katanga of civil and human rights?

Next evening I had an appointment with Mr. Urquhart to make up for the one missed. He was unable to keep that one, too: this time Swedish troops had arrested a Belgian electrician with his family. This alleged “mercenary” had lived for twenty years in Katanga, I was told. It took Mr. Urquhart six hours to set him free.

I cannot but praise Mr. Urquhart for preferring to obtain the release of innocent people, arbitrarily arrested by his troops, to conversing with me. Certainly a man more interested in favorable publicity than in genuine work for the welfare of those he is able to help would have acted otherwise. Yet, does the mission of the U.N. require or permit its troops to make arbitrary arrests without legal restraints, without warrants, without the possibility of legal remedy, punishment or compensation? Is it necessary for the U.N. to be so disorganized that each national troop unit obeys the overall civilian commander only grudgingly after lengthy persuasion, even on clearly non-military matters? Is this the example of discipline and of civilian supremacy set by the U.N?


UNEXPLODED THREAT: *This U.N. projectile failed to explode when it landed among buildings of the Prince Leopold Hospital in Elisabethville.*




A search
that ended
in death


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On December 12, 1962, Professor Coureaux of the University of Katanga set out from the University for his home. With him in his car were two white women. When he did not arrive home, Mr. Olivet, a representative of the International Red Cross, organized a search. Mr. Olivet and his two companions also disappeared. In the following days, Professor Coureaux's undamaged auto, its University markings replaced by UN markings, was seen, driven by Ethiopian soldiers. Mr. Olivet's Red Cross Ambulance was found (top, right) badly damaged (but with roof intact), and with bullet-holes in the windshield. When returned by UN forces, the ambulance (at right) no longer had a roof, and the bullet-riddled windshield had been removed. Finally, all six occupants of both vehicles were found, murdered.





Shown are the corpses of the three Red Cross Workers: (top left) Mr. Smeding, a Dutch national; (top right) Madame Vroonen, the driver, and Mr. Olivet (lower left). At lower right, the funeral of Mr. Olivet and his associates. (For further details, see appendix.)



VI SOME TANGENTIAL MATTERS

1. Financial
Interests
in
Katanga
and the
Congo:

32

THEIR INFLUENCE

THE conspiracy theory of history, widely held in the past, attributes whatever developments are disliked by the historian to powerful conspiracies of evil though hidden, or disguised forces. In the past, these forces were supernatural: the world's troubles were caused by devils, demons, witches, etc. In modern times, they have been secularized. This has permitted the conspiracy theory to progress, from non-demonstrable assertions to demonstrably wrong ones.

In its secular and progressive form, the theory is with us as much as ever. The Nazi ideology held the Jews (and "the System") responsible for whatever went wrong. It has been discredited. The Marxian ideology (a pseudo-scientific offspring of the conspiracy theory which in turn spawned its degenerate bastard child in the Nazi ideology) holds the rich (and the "Capitalist System") responsible. It has not been fully discredited.

ted.¹ Even outside the communist countries, vulgarized parts of the Marxian ideology have achieved a firm hold over journalistic fancy. Events that are not immediately understood — owing to unavoidable ignorance, or to reluctance to bother studying the complex forces that shape them — are attributed to the dark machinations of international cartels, Wall Street or other symbols of financial romanticism.

Sometimes an attempt is made to show that these events are likely to be favorable to the financial interests which are, therefore thought to have brought them about. As a piece of reasoning this is on a par with attributing death in general, or that of a particular person, to the machinations of undertakers (or funeral directors

¹However, advertisers already bid fair to take the place of capitalists in the books of new ideologues such as Professor Kenneth Galbraith.

as they are now called) who can be shown, with the same impeccable logic, to have a vested interest in death from which they draw their income. But even this pretense to *cui bono* reasoning (however primitive) is becoming rare. Most of the time the journalist who adorns his prose with allusions to the dark secrets of international financial interests scarcely worries whether the events they supposedly caused were likely to have been desired by them. If the presence of financial interests can be demonstrated, it is enough. Everybody knows they are evil, and behind everything evil.¹

Events in the faraway Congo are confused enough to make it an ideal screen for such fantasy projections. Thus, among those who like their history simple, and unconfused by facts, it is widely accepted that Belgium financial interests organized the Katanga struggle and whatever else seemed to go wrong in the Congo. (If the speaker happens to be Irish, sinister British interests are added for good measure.)²

There is a grain of truth in this ocean of clap-

¹The German Social Democrat, August Bebel, once called anti-Semitism "the socialism of the middle class." It is ironic that this socialist aphorism now illuminates the function of socialism itself. For socialism, in vulgarized form, has become the historical metaphysic of the ignorant.

Not that all ignorant persons are socialists, or all socialists ignorant persons. Rather, vulgarized versions of the socialist ideology lead themselves exceedingly well to viewing history as a soap opera struggle between the forces of goodness (the poor) and of the evil (the corporate rich)—just as vulgarized versions of other theologies did in the past.

trap. The major enterprises of the Congo are owned by Belgian investors, through Belgian corporations. The immense Belgian holding company, *Société Generale*, dominates the Congo economy, although its Congo interests represent only 16% of its total holdings.³

Of the total assets the *Société Generale* holds in the Congo, about 50% are located in Katanga. Outside Katanga, the major investment includes most of the Congo's transportation systems; in Katanga (and South Kasai) mostly mining enterprises. Investment in these enterprises occurs through shareholding in numerous separate corporations, in which the Congolese government owns, on the average, about 18% of the shares. These are now held in trust by the Belgian government, but are acknowledged to belong to the Congo government as the legal successor to the colonial administration, which acquired them by law in exchange for licenses, charters and the like.

²Belgians, British and Katangans, not to be left behind, allude to the sinister influences of American Copper Mining Corporations to explain American actions against Tshombe. These Copper Mining interests are said to try to get the (Belgian) Katanga competition out of the way by destroying the mines there. No one seems to be willing to give stupidity the credit it so richly deserves. Both the wickedness and the intelligence of our foreign policy are vastly overrated by friend and foe, alike.

³However, 30% of its income came from the Congo in 1959. These figures are gleaned from publicly available and official sources; but they necessarily involve elements of judgment. Valuations of investments always do—else the stockmarket would not be as hazardous and changeable as it is.

2. THE ROLE OF UNION MINIERE

IN Katanga, the dominating enterprise is the *Union Minière du Haute Katanga*. Some 18% of its shares belong to the government of the Congo. Another 14% are held by the Tanganyika Corporation, a largely English holding company. *The Société Générale* holds 15% directly, and probably more indirectly. One way or other, it is said to hold ultimate control of *Union Minière*.

The main taxes paid by *Union Minière* are levied on its metal (mainly copper) exports; they were the major source of the revenue of the colonial administration. The exports were shipped from Katanga to Congo ports. Since the destruction of railway bridges and the disruption of relations with the rest of the Congo, *Union Minière* has shipped its products through Rhodesia; thus the taxes were levied by the Katanga government and retained by it.

The *Union Minière* is often accused of having deliberately deprived the central government of its tax revenue to make it available instead to the Katanga government. However, it seems that whether *Union Minière* preferred this arrangement or not, it could not have avoided it, if it wanted to go on doing business. Its establishments are located in Katanga, where the central government has not, and Tshombe has exercised control. Regardless of whether the directors of the corporation would have preferred to see their taxes go to Tshombe, Lumumba or Adoula, they had no choice. They could do business only by paying to Tshombe. This situation can change only as the central government and Tshombe come to a settlement.

I am not privy to the preferences that may prevail in the minds of the directors of *Union Minière*. Moreover, they are likely to differ. However, to the extent to which they are rational — and directors or executives of major business enterprises are likely to be rational as far as these en-

terprises are concerned — their major preference would be for an orderly government that lets them do business. Thus, I should think that they are likely to have felt relieved — and to have assisted — when Katanga seceded from the Lumumba mess. Their feeling was shared at that time by Kasavubu and Adoula, among others. Yet, with the prospect of an orderly central government, I do not see why they should prefer a separate Katanga.

Certainly a Katanga in hostile relations with the rest of the Congo is not in their interest. In the first place, military actions are bad for business generally. In the second place, there is a very real risk of destruction of extremely valuable mining installations. Finally and not least, exports via the Congo harbors are cheaper than via Rhodesia; and unless Katanga and the rest of the Congo come to an agreement, they are impossible. Finally, Katanga used to get food from the agricultural regions of the Congo. Now food comes from Rhodesia, at higher cost, which, in the long run, would increase the costs of *Union Minière*.

I cannot see, then, why *Union Minière* would prefer an independent Katanga to one that is part of the Congo. It has no reason to, and many reasons against, unless one assumes that independence means orderly conditions in which business can be done, and being part of the Congo does not. This does not seem to be a reasonable assumption to make for the future, though in the past it was not unreasonable.

From the viewpoint of the *Société Générale*, which probably controls the ultimate policy of *Union Minière*, there are additional reasons for favoring some form of unification. Fifty per cent of its Congo investments are outside Katanga. If the situation is really as it has been described by our State Department — such that without Katanga the Congo is not viable and with Katanga

it can prosper—why should the *Société Generale* sacrifice 50% of its investments for the sake of Katanga, when it can keep 100%? Even if the State Department description is biased, and the Congo could survive without Katanga, it surely would mean that the *Société Generale* would have to bear a far heavier burden than it bears when Katanga pays its more than proportionate share. Hence, the *Société Generale*, even more than *Union Minière*, has an interest in a unified and peaceful Congo.

All this is not to say that the *Société Generale*, or for that matter, *Union Minière*, have always acted in their best interests. Both are immense enterprises, riven by internal disagreements, and politics, as enterprises of such size usually are. Some executives may indeed have panicked and felt that it was better to keep Katanga, having written off the rest of the Congo. And in *Union Minière*, local executives may have taken a

parochial viewpoint. But I doubt that in either case their influence predominated within their organization. And I cannot see how the organizations themselves had an opportunity to play a major role in the developments after independence. What influence they have, however, is certainly going to be used in favor of some form of peaceful unification. Else, they must be totally irrational.

I know of no evidence suggesting—let alone proving—that *Union Minière*, or the *Société Generale* have been “behind” the Katanga endeavors for home rule. They are there, they are big, they pay their taxes, they are profitable—all this makes them suspect. Yet even if one were to treat such suspicions as though serious arguments, they would still lead one to conclude that these corporations are far more likely to favor a peacefully unified Congo than warring separate states.



AN AGED VICTIM: The body of Madame Derriks, machine-gunned with her son and a servant in their own home near the Lubumbashi quarter, occupied by U.N. Ethiopian troops. (For statement of a surviving servant, see Appendix).



KILLED BY ETHIOPIANS: While driving to the Lubumbashi quarter of Elisabethville to buy bread, this man (Mr. Alazraki, a white business executive) was machine-gunned by Ethiopian troops of the U.N. forces, who then robbed the body. (See Appendix.)

3. The Background of Congo Politics

THE Congo comprises hot, humid lowlands and the mineral-rich highlands of Katanga, blessed with a pleasant-enough climate. Flora and fauna too vary spectacularly; so does the population. So far there is only a brief and fitful common past—as a Belgian colony—to unite the Congo.

Some Congolese continue to live in their ancestral way. Many more are in some stage of development toward a modern industrial civilization. But with few exceptions, even the industrial workers and urban residents still feel their tribal roots, though they no longer have the tribal earth to nourish them. Most Congolese still feel primarily as members of their tribe. Their links with other Congolese belonging to other tribes are weak. The tribal identifications have important political effects; they will delay, though not prevent, a positive national Congolese identification. What there is now is a negative identification, as non-white, that is operative toward whites but not toward other Congolese, or in intra-Congolese matters.

The diversity of tribal backgrounds can hardly be over-estimated. Several main languages are spoken, and several hundred dialects deriving from them. There are regional main languages; but the only inter-regional and inter-tribal language is French. Ethnic backgrounds also differ greatly; there are pygmy tribes and near giants. Tribal cultures differ no less. The differences in marriage customs, dress and handicrafts, political institutions, economic practices, etc. are immense. Again, the only common institutions are of Belgian origin.

It is likely that most of the tribal customs and

institutions will recede before the advances of industrial civilization. A material gain will be purchased at the price of considerable cultural and psychological losses. But these are less tangible than the gains, and will be discounted. Whether it be desirable or not, the industrial wave of the future is desired and well nigh unavoidable. There is no doubt, though, that the period of transition will be difficult. Tribal institutions may well be fatally weakened before they are replaced. Too many people may find themselves at loose ends, both economically and psychologically. They may well form an explosive mass.

The transition to industrialization and nationhood is not made easier by the diverging views and interests of Congolese politicians. These politicians can be divided into two groups. One is fairly detribalized and urbanized: among them, Lumumba, Adoula, Bomboko (the foreign minister), Gizenga. They have few regional and tribal roots left, and their views are ideological rather than traditional. They are interested in centralization of government—which would increase their power and also, in their view, the chances of overcoming tribal and local obstacles to rapid industrialization. A second group of Congolese politicians has its roots and power bases in local tribes. Kasavubu, Tshombe, Munongo, Sendwe and Kalonji are among them. These politicians are usually more conservative and respectful of local and tribal tradition. Their power would be greater, the greater the degree of regional autonomy.

Terms such as "Communist", "Socialist", etc. should be applied to Congolese politicians with great caution. There are no fully trained and fully disciplined communists in the Congo. And as for brief attendance at Party schools, men have been known to return communist from Harvard, and anti-communist from Party schools in Moscow. However, the support and counsel a man is seeking and willing to accept from among foreign powers is significant. It is for this reason that I believe we may rightfully call the Lumumba-Gizenga group pro-communist.¹

¹ See, e.g., the documents submitted by President Kasavubu to the U.N. A/4711/Add 2, March 20, 1961, *passim* and particularly p. 194.

The split between the tribal and the detribalized groups requires compromise. In time economic factors will certainly shift much political power from local to central authorities. But centralized government now would do violence to all kinds of traditions and, probably, involve a dictatorship. Above all, under present circumstances, centralized government cannot govern effectively. It is likely to destroy regional and tribal institutions faster than they are replaced by industrial living. There is no functioning bureaucratic apparatus, there are no natives trained to man it. There are few people who would not see a central government exclusively as an opportunity to foster their tribal interests. In the main, speedy centralization would multiply corruption, inefficiency and delay, without much advantage to offset these evils. Effective administration is likely, for the time being, to be local administration. And it is local administration, as local as possible, that will provide training in democracy.

In theory, all Congolese politicians agree on decentralization. But there is so far no agreement on how much, and in what form. And among the detribalized political leaders there is a natural reluctance to give up a power that, at least in theory, they possess. Finally, some parts of the Congo are big taxpayers and actually and potentially rich earners of foreign currency,—e.g., Katanga (copper, uranium, cobalt, etc.) and South Kasai (industrial diamonds); whereas other parts are poor.¹ This, needless to say, complicates the problem of finding a formula to satisfy regional and national claims equitably.

Somewhat to my astonishment, I detected very few signs of hate or resentment between Congolese and Belgians—though some of the anti-white violence seems to belie this observation. Yet, I found Belgian and Congolese mingling far more freely than Negroes and whites mingle in the United States.

Whether by accident or by design, more resentment is directed against the Flemish Belgians

than against the Walloons. One reason may be that most of the former were small merchants and employees; whereas the Walloons, to a greater extent, represented the government and higher executive levels. Another possible reason is that the Flemish speak a language the Congolese do not understand; they may appear, to suspicious natives, to withhold secrets, to conspire, or, at least, to set themselves apart; whereas the Walloons, of course, speak French. But even the resentment against the Flemish Belgians seemed to me less bitter than one might expect.

All the same, the Congolese are immensely sensitive, suspicious and prone to believe in wild rumors. They are, at best, in their political adolescence. A great deal of patience and diplomacy is required to avoid offending sensibilities—and patience is easily strained when, as is the case at present, ambition and pretense far outstrip competence.

One may describe the Congolese-Belgian relation by the German term "*Hassliebe*". It seems quite analogous to an oedipal relationship in which the son both loves and hates the more competent and powerful father, who often abused his power. Nonetheless, he serves as a model to be emulated and outstripped; yet there is unavoidable ambiguity in one's attempt to take the father's place.

BOMBED HOSPITAL: A nun inspects damage done to hospital by the U.N. bombing of Elisabethville.



¹ And Katanga is geologically and tribally far more related to Rhodesia than to the Congo.

4. U. N. ABILITIES AND DISABILITIES:

the
prospect
before
us

WHEN the U.N. was launched, it embodied in new form mankind's ancient hopes for peace. Ever since, many people have naively tended to identify a hope so universally shared with its fulfillment. Many more, particularly in the United States, have been unwilling to let the harsh and sobering light of experience shine on their hopes. To them, a realistic assessment of U.N. actualities and possibilities is little short of treason; they prefer their dream. Yet, modest as the achievements of the U.N. may be, they deserve more than fervent affirmations of faith. Possibly the U.N. is the last best hope of mankind. Certainly critical scrutiny is the best and the only hope of the U.N.

In the present world situation, the United Nations are united in name only. "United Nations" is no more than a collective name for all the nations together. The U.N. is a legal fiction. It has no separate existence from the constituent nations—

neither an independent will, nor an independent power to impose it.¹ The U.N. has no judicial authority, and no enforcement power of its own. It is not actually bound by its charter, which is not interpreted, let alone enforced, by an independent authority. Hence, the charter and the U.N. organization itself are but a form of auto-suggestion expressing the wish of nations to be united, however much they disagree on the terms of the wished-for unity.

"U.N. actions" thus are the actions of a coalition of nations which, when they are in the majority in the voting bodies of the U.N. and not vetoed within the Security Council, can use the name "U.N. action" for their purposes. In prac-

¹*Nor must the U.N. be confused with a court of law. A court is separate from the litigants, and can enforce its will on them. The U.N., however, consists of the litigants, and the only power it has is their power.*



tice, the minority of members need not support the majority action; it can disobey and ignore adverse votes.¹ And should the majority try to enforce such a vote, the minority may resist *manu militari*, in which case we have a war between one coalition (U.N. majority) and another (minority). Korea is an instance of this possibility.

The U.N. disposes of no new and effective instruments for international peace, security or justice. The instruments available are those that have always been present; and their deficiencies well known. Votes in the East River building indicate how a majority of governments would like to see a particular issue decided. The actual decision then depends on whether those concerned agree; if not, on whether those who do can muster, and are willing to use, sufficient force to make the others comply. In short, objectors can be brought to heel only by war; and if a great power sides with them all the way, only by universal conflagration, or not at all.

All this does not mean that the U.N. is wholly useless—though it does raise the question whether the organization and its actions are worth what they cost. Yet, the frequent contacts among delegates, even the pretense of being united in a common organization, a host of subsidiary activities—all these can be useful.

The usefulness of these things can be more than offset, however, if we deceive ourselves into believing that the U.N. is more than a convenient meeting place and arena for diplomacy and propaganda. Particularly in the United States there has been a tendency at times to feel that our policy should be "support the U.N." regardless of what the United Nations, i.e., the majority of nations in it, are supporting; or, to feel that we cannot or should not act independently in certain matters, which we leave to the U.N. I can see no advantage in such a policy either for peace, or for the United States. The U.N. can be of use only if regarded as one of the possible policy instruments available, and not the most important.

¹ Illustrations abound: e.g., Soviet and Hungarian behavior on Hungary; Indian behavior on Kashmir; Israeli behavior on Jerusalem. (Usually, however, the U.N. avoids decisions unlikely to be enforceable.)



DIRECT HIT: Despite the plainly-visible Red Cross, this Elisabethville hospital (above, top) was hit by British-made Canberra bombers and Swedish Saab jets of the U.N. forces, causing heavy damage to facilities (above, center) and also additional casualties among patients and refugees. At bottom, nuns survey damage to a hospital wing.

Since the U.N. was founded, two developments have further limited its usefulness. First, enough "new nations" have joined to constitute a plurality. Though their interests are not ultimately different from ours, they feel that they can do best by remaining "uncommitted." And, in fact, American policy—for reasons, good and bad, that cannot be discussed here — has made neutralism a well-paying proposition. The upshot is that the U.N. Assembly will support aggression when it is directed toward "liberation" of territory occupied by "colonial" powers.¹ (Goa and New Guinea come to mind; and Katanga.)

Further, the governments of many uncommitted nations have little interest in restraining the Soviet Union. They have not yet learned how dangerous their noncommittal game may be. Hence, the U.N. is no longer a reliable instrument in the defense of freedom and security. (It never was an effective one.) Committing ourselves to the U.N. in the past meant to commit ourselves to our own policies. Now it means committing ourselves to questionable policies, and (in Katanga) policies contrary to justice and to our own interests.

A second difficulty has become quite apparent and is brought home by the Congo situation. If the U.N., carrying out the will of at least some of the governments constituting it, engages in administrative tasks, it must do so through a bureaucratic apparatus. (Living with a bureaucracy may be uncomfortable, but living without it is impossible.) But the U.N. bureaucracy has special disadvantages. It necessarily includes a number of people who owe major allegiance to their home countries. When the policies of these are incompatible with the decisions of the U.N. majority, or with the Secretariat's executive actions, these bureaucrats will try to sabotage them. Many of

the Congo difficulties may be credited to this—even though Mr. Hammarskjöld for the most part kept out Soviet U.N. employees.

There is a further connected difficulty. Our own Federal bureaucrats are limited in their power by judicial restraints, and by a government that must account to the voters. This is not the case for the U.N. functionaries. Of course, they are formally responsible to the Assembly. But that supervision is distant. The power of the Secretary General also is limited. He would have a hard time disciplining an Indian employee (which explains why Mr. Dayal was not recalled as fast as he should have been); or an African employee, let alone a Russian.²

In the Congo, some of the participating national governments (including Morocco, Ghana, *et al.*) threatened to withdraw their troops from U.N. command, and place them at Lumumba's disposal when he requested them to. This might well have happened had Lumumba not been dismissed by Kasavubu. And even now, as explained above, the U.N. troops are hardly disciplined, or reliable, should the home government not like a particular U.N. policy.

Apart from politics, a bureaucracy that is not responsible to voters is always likely to abuse its power, to be costly and to be inefficient. Here, too, the U.N. as an organization is likely to do worse than each nation can do for itself. Our own foreign aid program is hardly a model of efficiency. But its personnel is at least accountable to our Congress and can be changed when necessary. Nobody has such power over the U.N. bureaucracy—even though we pay for most of it.

¹ And it will barely protest aggression against and enslavement of a European power by the Soviet Union (Hungary).

² On the other hand, Bang-Jensen, a European was dismissed and driven to suicide because he wanted to remain an honorable man. His crime was refusing to break the promise he had given Hungarian refugee witnesses not to divulge their names (to avoid endangering their relatives in Hungary). He refused to hand these names to the Secretariat, knowing all too well from his own experience that they would not be protected against copying by Soviet employees of the U.N. Other U.N. employees have found it easier to break their promises.

APPENDIX

INTRODUCTION

I must leave the reader to draw his own conclusions from the following statements, selected from a great number available. Almost everybody in Elisabethville has a tale to tell: some were arrested arbitrarily, maltreated and released; others had their houses or businesses damaged by mortar fire, or robbed by U.N. soldiers; many had their cars stolen, and see U.N. soldiers driving around in them, but are unable to obtain the return of their cars. Still others had relatives and friends disappear, to find their bodies later. The tales range from minor inconveniences to the gravest crimes. Under the circumstances, a stringent selection was required. I have tried to present samples of most kinds of complaint, giving priority to the gravest, although the least grave (property damage, arbitrary arrest, robberies and thefts) are, of course, far most frequent.¹

The statements presented do not represent the conclusions of a proper judicial inquiry. Rather, they represent the allegations and facts that normally would lead to such an inquiry. Certainly, if witnesses were shot at, or heard, or saw other people shot down, if the bodies of whole families are found, if wounded children are cared for in hospitals, if ambulances are shot at and hospitals are strafed, if the body of a murdered professor is found while his car is being driven around by soldiers . . . this is enough to initiate an inquiry.

The U.N. has not initiated inquiries of its own: at least if such inquiries were initiated, they were not publicly announced. No public proceedings have taken place; no one has been formally accused; no witnesses have been called by the U.N.; nobody has been notified of any U.N. proceedings; no one among the U.N. personnel has been punished.

Precautions have not been taken. As I am writing this in March, I am in receipt of a letter from Elisabethville reporting some improvement, but also complaining that the U.N. continues to paralyze the economic life of the city (which in time undoubtedly will lead to unrest, justifying new interventions) and that robberies by U.N. soldiers continue sporadically.²

¹I have disregarded such crimes as rape, simply because, leaving no mark, they are hard to prove, and because, understandably, the victims often preferred to hide the crime. However, I was told by a gynecologist that he treated a number of victims, white and colored.

²The Swedish troops are said finally to have instituted a department to process civilian complaints against their unit. However, civilians seldom dare complain as long as their city is occupied, for fear of revenge by the occupying troops. I doubt that this situation will change until the civilians are convinced that the troops actually obey the authorities to which complaints are addressed. So far only the Indian troops are regarded as well disciplined, and their officers are highly praised — even though they certainly did their military duty with vigor.

STATEMENT OF W. F. L. BRIGHT

"This report describes two incidents in which I was personally involved when driving an ambulance during this period. I am a civil engineer of British nationality in charge of an engineering design office in Elisabethville.

"1. At about 4 p.m. on Tuesday 5 December [1961] we were called to the Sabena Guest House, which had been under heavy mortar fire, to collect two wounded. On arriving there we found that another ambulance had already collected them. We decided to return to the hospital. There were a large number of civilian men and women in the building who wanted to leave the area and who decided to form a convoy to follow our ambulance into town.

"As we approached to within about 300 yards of the U.N. positions on Ave. Redjaf near the intersection of Ave. Leplaie and Ave. Stanley I slowed down to allow the convoy to close up and to allow the U.N. troops to identify me. I approached making violent recognition signs and as my ambulance was alongside the position a Bren in the ditch fired two bursts at point blank range, not on the ambulance, but on the convoy immediately behind. I called out to the Gurkha machine gunner in English, 'Stop - they're civilians'. The gunner stopped firing but an N.C.O. ordered 'Fire'. Another burst was fired while I called out again that they were firing on civilians. The firing then stopped and an Indian officer came out and asked me what I was doing. I replied that I was escorting a convoy of civilian refugees from the Guest House into town. He got very excited and, in spite of my repeated protests that they were civilians said, 'They must go back immediately or I will again fire'.

"I had not noticed the exact positions of the vehicles in the convoy and looking back could not see immediately behind and to my right. I noticed however that vehicles were turning back and when the officer waved me on I drove into town under the impression that the fire had been directed with the object of frightening the convoy. The next morning when we went into the same vicinity to pick up three wounded we found the car immediately behind the ambulance had been hit by the fire and three European male civilian occupants were lying dead in the ditch.

"2. On Saturday 16 December M. Pierre Doupagne and I were travelling in an ambulance up Ave. des Usines towards the customs warehouse in the railway reserve. The time was about 5:45 p.m. As we did not know whether there were troops in the area we travelled slowly with the siren sounding. Just as we reached the house we were looking for we were fired on with two automatic weapons from a hedge on the edge of the railway reserve at about 250 yards. It was still light enough to see the red crosses on the ambulance clearly. We were not hit. We left the ambulance somewhat hurriedly and took shelter in the Boucherie Liegiose. The people there said they had seen Swedish troops take up positions behind the hedge that afternoon. We were shown a way out under cover and were prepared to abandon the ambulance. However we encountered a Katangais mobile patrol who were able to assure us that there were no Katangais positions anywhere in the vicinity from where the fire had come. They then escorted us back to the ambulance which we were able to retrieve under the cover of their machine guns."

W. F. L. Bright;
B.Sc. A.M.I.C.E. M.S.I.C. (France)
Consulting Engineer

AUTHOR'S NOTE

This young engineer seemed entirely trustworthy to me. He had volunteered his services as an ambulance driver, and told me that before the December events he was a fervent believer in the U.N.

The events he describes may well be due to hysteria and stupidity on the part of the soldiers in question, rather than to malice aforethought. But this is meager comfort to the dead. And, the U.N. has not investigated, or offered compensation.

How little protection an ambulance seems to have afforded is also indicated by the death of the representative of the Red Cross, Olivet, referred to elsewhere in the text. According to a memorandum submitted to the International Red Cross in Geneva by the physicians of Elisabethville, altogether 32 unarmed civilians were murdered by U.N. troops in December. This number excludes all those victims who were slain by bullets, or mortar shells, the origin of which was not definitely established.

**DECLARATION OF M. HERMAN ROBILIART,
PRESIDENT OF UNION MINIERE DU
HAUT-KATANGA.**

"Impartial observers, as well as representatives of the press can see for themselves on the spot the large damage caused to the Kolwezi and Luilu installations, to the railroad stations, to rolling stock, and to the residential quarters.

"Union Minière is ready to provide numerous documents and photographs to any international commission of enquiry which may be constituted to investigate this situation."

AUTHOR'S NOTE

In an all-out war, the installations in question may well be regarded as proper military targets. But so far the U.N. has denied that it is, or was, engaged in all-out war. Hence, it would be quite worthwhile to investigate 1) whether these installations were damaged as stated; 2) why.

**EXTRACT OF TESTIMONY OF WITNESS, ANDRE
KAPENGA, BEFORE THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY -
ELISABETHVILLE, JANUARY 2, 1962**

"On Saturday the 16th of December, 1961, about 6 o'clock in the morning, trucks transporting colored United Nations troops occupied the vicinity of Mr. Derricks' house. Nothing noteworthy happened up to 1:45 p.m. At that time, while Mr. Derricks and his mother were having their after-lunch coffee, a big vehicle, armed with machine guns, started shooting toward Lubumbashi. The soldiers finished shooting about an hour later and entered the garden of the house. They shot at the two cars which stood before the garage. Thereupon the witness Kapenga took refuge in a small storeroom near the kitchen, into which he locked himself. He heard the soldiers enter the kitchen and shoot a submachine gun volley at Jean Fimbo. His body was found in the kitchen the next day.

"A few seconds later he heard Mr. Derricks shout in English 'not me', and thereupon a second machinegun volley. (This probably killed Mr. Derricks in the salon, where his body was found the next day.) A third machinegun volley was heard a few seconds later. (This probably killed Mme. Derricks, who was found the next day near her son at the door to the terrace.) The soldiers shot numerous other volleys into the walls and windows and left.

"The sector in which Mr. Derricks' house is located was at the date in question occupied by United Nations troops, mainly Ethiopians."

AUTHOR'S NOTE

This witness is the surviving one of Mr. Derricks' two servants. Derricks was a high executive of the Union Minière.

The evidence is indirect. Note however, that: 1) the events happened in the Ethiopian occupied sector; 2) the witness testified that he had been told by Mr. Derricks, before the events, that the troops outside were Ethiopians; 3) the witness heard the soldiers speak in a language unfamiliar to him; 4) he had seen the soldiers to be colored.

All this points to Ethiopian troops. (For reasons of space, only the most salient part of the testimony is reproduced.)

THE ALAZRAKI CASE

On December 19th, at about 11 a.m., Mr. Alazraki, an executive, with his mother-in-law, Mme. Wouters, drove to the Lulumbashi Quarter to buy bread. Ethiopian machine gunners shot at the car and wounded Alazraki. He left the car and dragged himself for a small distance. His attackers continued to shoot. He was killed.

His mother-in-law had crouched on the floor of the car. She saw the Ethiopians rob the body. Her own watch and pocket-book were taken from her and she was told to leave. Examination of the body of Mr. Alazraki shows that he was killed by shots fired from a very short distance.

AUTHOR'S NOTE

The identification of the attackers seems clear. The circumstances seem to indicate prima facie that robbery was the ultimate motive rather than military necessity, or error.

**EXTRACT FROM INTERROGATION OF WITNESS BY
THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY - JANUARY 3, 1962**

QUESTION: "What do you know about the Dedeken matter?"

ANSWER: "On the 15th [December], at about 1:30 p.m., I saw three Ethiopian soldiers enter the PULMAN House. They broke the windows with their guns and then shot at the dog. I went out, hearing the noise, and looked up the road where I saw an Ethiopian soldier pointing his gun toward Mr. Smith's house. Mr. Dedeken was alone in this house, guarding it in Mr. Smith's absence. I saw Mr. Dedeken with a book in his hand, standing in the garden. An Ethiopian soldier, hidden behind a tree, shot him down at a distance of about 30 meters . . ."

(Signed) H. van Dijk
(Dutch citizen)

AUTHOR'S NOTE

This is an extract from lengthy testimony before the District Attorney. I obtained special permission from President Tshombe to reproduce it. (Under Katanga legal rules, testimony in the investigatory phase cannot normally be published.)

**DECLARATION OF THE RECTOR OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF KATANGA (ELISABETHVILLE)**

"On December 12th, 1961, at about 2:30 p.m., Professor Coureaux left the Rector's office to drive back to his house, situated in an area occupied, at that moment, by U.N. Ethiopian troops. Towards 3 p.m., he was seen at the Kasapa police camp in the company of Mme. Vermeir and Lippert, in a vehicle bearing quite visibly the inscription 'Université de l'Etat'.

"Not receiving any news of Mr. Coureaux's whereabouts, we got in touch with Mr. Olivet, the International Red Cross Representative. Mr. Olivet promised to organize a search party without any delay.

"Mr. Olivet and his two companions disappeared in their turn while carrying out their noble mission.

"During the following days, the University's Landrover, which had been used by Mr. Coureaux, was seen in several places, driven by Ethiopian soldiers. The University markings had been obliterated by three black bars and replaced by U.N. markings.

"In spite of the information we supplied about this, in spite of my intervention and that of Mr. Senn, the new Red Cross Representative, the car has not been returned to this day, although it bore no trace of any damage.

"The hope of finding Mr. Coureaux alive lingered in our hearts. Yet when the corpses of Mr. Olivet, Mme. Vroonen and Mr. Smeding were discovered, we could not but think that Mr. Coureaux might have been the victim of a similar murder.

"The bodies of Professor Coureaux and of Mme. Lippert and Vermeir have just been discovered. Without the slightest doubt, they were shot down cold-bloodedly in the Ethiopian area, and they were shamelessly robbed.

"By keeping silent for a moment longer, I should fail in my duty both as a free human being and as Rector of this University."

Elisabethville,
February 20, 1962

(Signed) Joachim Frankiel
Rector of the University

AUTHOR'S NOTE

The Rector had told me about the disappearance of Professor Coureaux - but he had refused to speculate on the causes in the absence of facts. Some people, he insisted, have been held by the U.N. without being able to communicate, and he had hopes that this was Professor Coureaux's case even though the U.N. denied knowing his whereabouts.

No witness to the murder of the three persons has come forward. The preliminary indications that the murderers were Ethiopians are: 1) the bodies apparently were found in the Ethiopian occupied sector; 2) the victims' car was seen undamaged being driven by Ethiopian soldiers.¹

As in all these cases, the proof is not conclusive. But it certainly is sufficient to justify the investigation of reasonable suspicions by appropriate authorities. So far the U.N. has prevented full investigation by civilian authorities of any of these cases. And there have been no investigations by U.N. authorities, or the results have not been made public.

¹Which means that the victims were shot outside the car, i.e. not through error.

ATTACK ON A CHILD

"Maurice Mwanza, five years old, has been at the hospital Prince Leopold since December 17 [1961].

"On that date, Ethiopian soldiers killed his father with bayonets.

"The child took refuge in bed. An Ethiopian soldier slashed him there with his bayonet.

"His mother carried him to the hospital on her back.

"I am the child's floor nurse."

(Signed) Sister Edwald, Jan. 5, 1962
(of the Sisters of Charity of Ghent)

AUTHOR'S NOTE

I saw the child and spoke with the mother through an interpreter. She insisted that there was no doubt of the identity of the attackers, and felt that, confronted with them, she would recognize them.

The child will survive, though he may lose use of the muscles of one leg.

REPORT BY DR. BEIKEART CONCERNING THE AERIAL ATTACK ON THE HOSPITAL OF SHINKOLOBWE, DECEMBER 12, 1961

"The buildings comprising the hospital of Shinkolobwe are clearly marked by an enormous red cross painted on the roof of the administration building. This hospital complex is absolutely isolated from any other construction within a radius of 1,500 meters, except for African residential quarters, of which the nearest are several hundred meters from the hospital. [This hospital was attacked by U.N. planes.]

"Arriving from Kanbove, my assistants and I were met in the lobby of the hospital by people crying desperately over their dead, and by wounded who stoically expected nothing more from anyone. Two men and a child were dead. Four gravely wounded were evacuated to Jadotville. I took back to Kambove ten other wounded, while some thirty other victims were cared for on the spot.

"The administration building, the left wing consisting of four pavilions and the building housing the kitchen, dining room and laundry were bombarded; hundreds of bullet holes testify to machinegun fire.

"In one of the maternity pavilions four pregnant women and one children's nurse were wounded. One four year old child, a visitor, was killed.

"The roof, ceiling, walls, beds, tables and chairs were riddled with bullets. The blood of the wounded gives the place the air of a battle field. A bomb exploded in a second pavilion, fortunately unoccupied — the roof, ceiling, half the walls, and the equipment were blown away. Thousands of bullet marks and bomb shrapnel of all sizes testify to the attack on the pavilions, the administration building, and the kitchen and laundry.

"The hospital, without water or electricity, has been evacuated."

AUTHOR'S NOTE

This is one of several hospitals that were attacked. It seems unlikely that all these hospitals were strategically situated. Nurses and physicians in all of those I visited denied that they were used by snipers. I find it hard to believe that the nurses — mainly nuns dedicated to service — lied to me.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR...

AFTER teaching at City College and the University of Minnesota, Ernest van den Haag became (and still is) a member of the faculty of New York University and the New School for Social Research. He lectures widely, and is the author of *Education as an Industry* and of *The Fabric of Society* (with Ralph Ross), a widely used textbook in the social sciences. He has published many articles in American and foreign learned journals.

Left wing magazines (such as *Le Temps Modernes*; *The New Leader*; *Dissent*) and right wing magazines (such as *Modern Age* and *National Review*) have been equally hospitable to his articles, in addition to journals such as *Daedalus*, *Diogenes*, *Encounter*, *Commentary*, *Commonweal*, *Partisan Review*, *Science*, *The American Scholar*, *The Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political Science*, etc.

Professor van den Haag is a fellow of the American Sociological Association and of the Royal Economic Society.

